Active Causal Agents and the Integrity of Protection Analysis in Syria
The Syria case example examines when explosive ordnance contamination constitutes a protection risk and why analytical precision is essential. There is no question that explosive ordnance contamination represents one of the most pervasive and enduring threats to human safety in Syria. The analytical question, however, is whether and when this constitutes a protection risk and why that distinction matters for the implementation of the Centrality of Protection.
Protection focuses on risks arising from identifiable human actors intentionally inflicting violence, coercion, or deliberate deprivation. Explosive devices are modalities of harm, not risks in themselves. Where armed groups deliberately deploy IEDs to confine communities, prevent returns, or reinforce territorial control, the risk stems from ongoing behavior that may be influenced through coordinated action. Where legacy contamination remains after actors withdraw, the danger persists, but the response required is sectoral work, rather than a multi-disciplinary protection response.
The case shows that separating active protection risks from residual hazards strengthens analysis and programming. Conflating them obscures accountability, weakens theories of change, and risks expanding protection into a catch-all category for harm. Preserving the role of the threat actor clarifies when coordinated, HCT-led, multi-sector engagement is needed.
RBP Questions
1. How might a country-wide protection strategy account for major hazards and dangers to the civilian population that are not protection risks?
2. In your own context, are there hazards being labeled “protection risks” primarily because they’re dangerous or high-profile, rather than because a threat actor can be identified and influenced?
3. How can humanitarian actors avoid “mission creep” in protection without appearing to deprioritize genuinely life-threatening hazards like UXO?