# A MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CENTRALITY OF PROTECTION

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# INTRODUCTION

## THE INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE POLICY ON PROTECTION IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION

The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Protection Policy, adopted in 2016, reaffirms the importance of protection in humanitarian action while emphasizing that it is the collective responsibility of all humanitarian actors. The Policy frames protection as an outcome to be achieved through the reduction of risks to violence, coercion, and deliberate deprivation of populations living through crisis. In doing so, the Policy asks humanitarian actors to move beyond an understanding of protection as an activity or set of activities to be conducted. Furthermore, the Policy emphasizes that reducing protection risk is the responsibility of the entire humanitarian system, as opposed to being a sectoral activity conducted by the protection cluster alone. This includes agencies both with and without a specific protection mandate.

## THE BENCHMARKS FOR HUMANITARIAN COUNTRY TEAM COLLECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IASC POLICY

Following a review of progress made since the Policy's adoption, conducted in 2022, the decision was made to define specific Benchmarks for Humanitarian Country Teams (HCTs) to use in order to measure progress in implementation of the IASC Policy on Protection in Humanitarian Action. The Benchmarks provide a risk-based approach to guide HCTs on their specific responsibilities for delivering a collective response to the protection risks faced by communities living through crisis. They also provide some indications of which actors should take the lead on specific aspects of the Policy's implementation, although these are subject to contextualization depending on the nature of the crisis and the humanitarian actors at hand. In all cases, however, the Benchmarks provide three core areas of action:

- **Benchmark #1:** conduct continuous comprehensive intersectoral analysis of protection risks.
- **Benchmark #2:** implement a collective, adaptive, multi-disciplinary protection action plan, informed by the protection analysis.
- **Benchmark #3:** document interim results and protection outcomes of reduced risk in real time.

It is expected that implementation of the benchmarks will be overseen by the entire HCT, and will, where appropriate, engage other key actors such as community members, local/national non-governmental agencies (L/NAs), local and national governments, and human rights, peace and development actors.[1]

## THE IASC TOOLKIT TO SUPPORT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CENTRALITY OF PROTECTION FOR HCTS

In order to help implement the IASC Protection Policy, the IASC Task Team 1 on the Centrality of

1 Section 2, below, presents a graphic representation of how these actors and activities can work together towards the goal of protection risk reduction.

Protection has developed a Toolkit for HCTs. The Toolkit includes:

- **The benchmarks document**, outlining the detailed actions, responsibilities and means of verification for each of the three benchmarks.

- **An aid memoire**, which provides conceptual clarity on the Centrality of Protection and outlines roles and responsibilities and other relevant processes in support of its implementation.

- **The measurement framework**, herein, which provides HCTs with guidance on how to ensure the documentation of interim and longer-term results of their protection action plans and feed into real time adaptations of the plans in response to observed changes in the protection risk patterns to measure protection outcomes

## THE RATIONALE FOR THE MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK

The Measurement framework can help HCs and HCTs demonstrate how the IASC system is contributing to reduced protection risks on the ground over time. It should allow HCs and HCTs to answer the question of whether the IASC mechanism is contributing to reduced protection risks for communities, and if not, why?

As such, the framework is in line with, but additional to, recent advancements in the common understanding of the core protection risks faced by people and communities living through humanitarian crisis[2] as well as the updated tools for analyzing these risks.[3]

The framework provides HCTs with a tool to observe changes in protection risk patterns faced by community members, such as changes in the behavior of armed actors towards civilians, or improvements in community-based threat monitoring systems and capacities to prevent protection violations occurring, or reductions in vulnerability of displaced persons to trafficking or negative coping strategies that present protection risks. But crucially, it also provides tools for analyzing the contribution of the IASC mechanism towards these changes, alongside the influence of external actors and evolving crisis dynamics.

By collecting information about changes in the protection risk patterns, and then analyzing the contribution of the protection action plans towards the achievement of these changes, it is hoped that HCTs will be able to (i) make any necessary changes to their protection action plans on the basis of reliable information about how protection risks are evolving in real-time; and (ii) demonstrate accountability towards the protection action plans, Benchmarks, and ultimately the application of the IASC Protection Policy. In this way, the humanitarian system as a whole should be better equipped to demonstrably take collective responsibility for the reduction of protection risks for communities living through crisis.

To do this well, HCTs will need to ensure both the collection of meaningful information about protection risk patterns as they evolve, and the desegregation of external factors in their analysis of the data. This process, outlined in the Measurement framework below, is intended to be as simple and streamlined as possible, while nevertheless providing reasonable evidence as to the contribution of the HCT to changes

2 https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/protection-issues
3 https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/field-support/Protection-Analytical-Framework

in the protection risk patterns observed. Doing so will allow HCTs to explain why, for instance, a particular course of advocacy with conflict parties is important to continue even when the outcome data suggests protection risks are increasing. Likewise, it will allow HCTs to credibly evidence the contributions they have made when protection risks demonstrably reduce following the implementation of their protection action plans.

## INTENDED USERS OF THE MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK

The measurement framework is intended for use by HCs and HCT members, all of whom will be tasked with collecting data regarding both changes in protection risk patterns and HCT practices supporting these. It is expected that HCs ensure the establishment or continuation of protection analysis teams, who are able to provide data collection and analysis support to this process. Crucially, protection analysis teams will be expected to:

- contextualize the theory of change,
- develop indicators and domains of change for measurement, and
- synthesize the information gathered to report back to the HCT and support adaptation of the protection action plan.

For this reason, the framework has been written for non-evaluation specialists who are unfamiliar with the key methods and data collection approaches presented below. Language and methods have been selected to encourage high quality data collection and analysis without specialist evaluation capacity. There are some exceptions to this, such as outcome harvesting and most significant change, where external evaluation experts are best placed to facilitate open discussion of changes observed. These exceptions are noted, and in all other cases, it should be assumed that program and policy teams are best placed to use this framework.

## OVERVIEW OF THE MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK

The Measurement framework provides the following elements for use when conducting MEAL activities in line with Benchmark #3:

- **A global theory of change:** a simple presentation of the intended pathways of change to reduce protection risk when using the benchmarks.
- **Self-assessment tool:** a guide to assessing the entry-points and constraints for making progress against the Benchmarks within your specific HCT system.
- **Examples of output-level indicators and domains of change:** example indicators and areas of activity to measure changes in HCT practices that can support Benchmark implementation. The examples are provided for learning purposes only. Each context will need to determine appropriate indicators based on their circumstances and the contextualized Theories of Change developed per risk.

- **Outcome-level indicators and domains of change:** an outline of indicators and areas of interest where changes in protection risk are expected to be observable. Again, the examples provided here are for learning purposes only. Each context will need to determine appropriate indicators based on their circumstances and the contextualized Theories of Change developed per risk.

- **Overview of data collection and analysis tools:** an overview of tools for data collection regarding changes in HCT practices and associated protection risk patterns as well as analysis of the HCT system's contributions to the changes observed.

- **Step-by-step guide to data collection tools:** a step-by-step guide to using the data collection tools provided including responsibilities for data collection, frequency and timing of use, and data sources.

HCs and HCTs already conduct a variety of activities that can, if leveraged correctly, enhance analysis of protection risk reduction. The tools presented in the Measurement framework below are intended to leverage these where possible, and add to them only where necessary.

## THEORY OF CHANGE

The figure below presents a simplified version of the intended pathways of change provided in the Benchmarks and the IASC Protection Policy. It includes three levels of analysis:

- **Activities** undertaken specifically by the HCT in line with the Benchmarks
- **Outputs**, or direct products, of these activities in terms of the degree to which the humanitarian system takes collective responsibility for reducing protection risk
- **Outcomes** of these activities relating to the reduced protection risk faced by affected populations.

Critically, the outcome of reduced protection risk is understood in relation to the protection risk equation, as defined by the InterAction Results-Based Protection framework, namely:




Risk is thus understood as a combination of three key factors:

- **Threats:** the source of the risk (e.g. an armed group who perpetrates sexual violence, or an area of land contaminated with explosive ordnance).
- **Vulnerabilities:** the distinct factors that make a person or group of people susceptible to that particular threat (e.g. membership of a certain ethnic group)
- **Capacities:** a person's or a community's ability to mitigate that threat (e.g. coping mechanisms like walking in groups rather than alone when collecting firewood).

These components are related by the risk questions such that:

- Reducing threats and vulnerabilities should, all other things being equal, reduce risks.
- Increasing community capacities should, all other things being equal, reduce risk.

In addition to introducing the protection risk equation, the theory of change makes space for the role of other relevant actors outside the formal humanitarian architecture, which is important given the complex nature of protection risks, and their fragility in the face of changes in the external context.




The key points of note for the Measurement framework are as follows:

1. **Context-specific activities, risks and assumptions should be developed for each priority protection risk identified by the HCT:** the Protection Policy and associated Benchmarks do not provide explicit assumptions about how and why the activities are considered to be appropriate to the task of reducing protection risk. Outlining these assumptions is a critical part of most theory-based evaluation approaches. As such, it is recommended that HCTs use the simplified theory of change above as a starting point to build a context-specific theory of change, listing specific activities undertaken in the protection action plan and the assumptions made about how these activities will reduce the specific threats, vulnerabilities and capacities identified in the protection analysis. Examples of what such a context-specific theory of change should look like are given in Annex I of this document. Analysis of the results achieved by the action plan can then include an assessment of whether the assumptions are holding true on the balance of evidence collected under Benchmark #3 and thereby support learning about what is working and why as part of a real-time learning process.

2. **The three benchmarks feed into one another:** the design and implementation of a protection action plan, under Benchmark #2, should be based on the results of the initial protection risk analysis undertaken under Benchmark #1. Likewise, adaptation of the protection action plan should be based on analysis from both the continuous protection risk analysis undertaken under Benchmark #1 and the documentation of results achieved under Benchmark #3. The Measurement framework will need to have the capacity to capture these interactions when analysing the various aspects of the HCT's contributions to any observed changes in protection risk patterns. For example, if the risk of civilian casualties in a conflict is significantly increased by the entry into conflict of a new conflict actor, the

Measurement framework will need to be able to assess the degree to which (i) this change has been captured by the protection risk analysis (ii) the information in the revised risk analysis has influenced an adaptation in the protection action plan; and (iii) any changes to the protection risks observed following this adaptation.

3. **Protection risk analysis is conducted under both benchmark #1 and #3:** the fact that HCTs will be conducting protection risk analysis as part of their obligations under benchmark #1 provides an opportunity for streamlining outcome-level data collection. Benchmark #1 requires HCTs to ensure that the establishment of (or identification of a pre-existing) dedicated, multi-disciplinary, interagency team to conduct continuous protection analysis. This team is expected to provide continuous information about changes in the patterns of threat, vulnerability and capacity observed in and informed by the affected communities. Such information should be used by the Measurement framework as evidence of changes to risk patterns, but the framework should also provide the opportunity to add further qualitative information about risk perception, or observed changes in behaviour, attitude and practice among key protection duty bearers, perpetrators of protection violations, and vulnerable groups and their communities.

4. **Protection risks can be reduced by internal and external actors:** both the Benchmarks and IASC Protection Policy recognised the role of non-humanitarian agencies in protection. This includes human rights, development and peace actors, as well as local and national non-governmental and governmental agencies. The Measurement framework will need to provide analysis of the contribution of the humanitarian system in changing protection risk patterns, while separating out the contributions of external actors and factors. This task is complicated by the absence of comparison population groups for the purposes of analysis. Instead, the Measurement framework proposes a simplified form of contribution analysis to provide a qualitative assessment of the contributions made by the HCT to the changes in protection patterns observed.

# SELF-ASSESSMENT TOOL

The following tool is designed to help HCs and HCTs assess the current state of play regarding the Centrality of Protection and Benchmark implementation in their specific context. This is useful for both:

(i) understanding entry points and constraints to achieving the Benchmarks;

(ii) establishing baseline data in terms of the degree to which key aspects of the Benchmarks are already met in their current context.

| Question |
|---|
| **1. What types of protection analysis are already being produced?** |
| ▶ 1.a. Are Protection Analysis Updates currently being produced by the Protection Cluster and Areas of Responsibility?<br>▶ 1.b. Are collective protection analyses[4] being conducted by any interagency or multi-disciplinary groups?<br>▶ 1.c. Do the protection analyses produced by the Protection Cluster, AoR, or interagency groups provide context-specific information about each priority risk identified in the protection action plan?<br>▶ 1.d. Do the protection analyses produced by the Protection Cluster, AoR, or interagency groups cover threats, vulnerabilities and community capacities to mitigate these risks? |
| **2. How does protection analysis currently fit into the Humanitarian Program Cycle?** |
| ▶ 2.a. When in the Humanitarian Program Cycle are protection analyses (collective or otherwise) being conducted?<br>▶ 2.b. How and to what extent are protection analyses (collective or otherwise) being used to inform needs assessment and analysis?<br>▶ 2.c. How and to what extent are protection analyses (collective or otherwise) contributing to strategic response plans? |
| **3. Are protection analyses informing collective protection priorities?** |
| ▶ 3.1. Have collective protection priorities for HCT action been identified?<br>▶ 3.2. How aligned are the collective protection priorities to the protection risks identified in the protection analyses (collective or otherwise)?<br>▶ 3.3. Are the collective protection priorities designed to include context-specific information about the threats (e.g. which threat actors), vulnerabilities (e.g. which groups, when and where are most vulnerable), and capacities (e.g. informal community-based risk monitoring groups or systems)? |

4 "Collective protection analysis" herein refers to any analysis that covers protection risks falling under more than one AoR and/or from protection actors outside the Protection Cluster.

| Question |
| --- |
| **4. Have context-specific pathways for change been identified?** |
| ▶ 4.1. Have collective and context-specific pathways for change been identified for each component of the priority protection risk?<br>▶ 4.2. If such pathways have been identified, do they: (i) cover each part of the risk equation (threat, vulnerability and capacity), (ii) bring together activities from multiple different actors (e.g. humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, security, human rights advocates), (iii) identify the assumptions underpinning the pathways for change, (iv) base those assumptions on evidence,? |
| **5. Which actors can support continuous analysis of community-based data about evolving protection risks?** |
| ▶ 5.1. Which actors are in a position to conduct continuous, collective protection risk analysis and feed the results into updated protection action plans?<br>▶ 5.2. What avenues does the HCT have for collecting community-based information about protection risks as they evolve? |
| **6. Have protection analysis and action plans been validated with and by communities?** |
| ▶ 6.1. Are actors able to engage effectively with communities using appropriate tools that can help inform proposed activities within a protection action plan?<br>▶ 6.2. Have diverse community perspectives helped to inform and validate protection action plans? |

Answers to the questions should also help users navigate the measurement framework to focus on the most useful elements for their context:



## OUTPUT-LEVEL INDICATORS AND DOMAINS OF CHANGE

Output-level measures help establish how far the HCT has moved beyond the situation reported in the self-assessment tool. For example, in a context where Protection Analysis Updates were not being used to inform adaptations to the protection action plan at the time of the self-assessment, output-level measures can be used to record any improvements in this regard over time.

To facilitate measurement of the wide range of ways in which HCT practice and arrangements have changed during the protection action plan implementation, and how these have contributed to the implementation of the Benchmarks, this framework recommends the use of two different types of measurement tools – indicators and domains of change:

- **Indicators:** measures of specific, measurable, achievable, and time-bound measures of change, whether quantitative or qualitative. For example, the inclusion of priority protection risks and accompanying outcomes to be achieved as a Strategic Objective in the public Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) or internal protection action plan.

- **Domains of change:** broader areas of analysis in which changes may be observed. Domains of change specify the area of HCT practice in which a change might be observed, but unlike indicators, they do not specify precisely what change is relevant for analysis. For example, changes in the use of protection risk analysis for decision-making among HCT members. This domain of change specifies the area of HCT practice of interest for measurement (i.e. the use protection risk analysis for decision-making) but does not specify the specific change as an indicator would (e.g. the number of times an HCT member reports making a decision on the basis of the protection risk analysis).

The example indicators and domains of change presented in the table below are intended for learning purposes only. In truth, the complexity of protection risk means that no single standardized set of indicators or domains of change will be optimal across all contexts. Instead, protection analysis teams will need to design context-specific indicators and domains of change to fit the context-specific theory of change they develop for each of the priority protection risks identified by the HCT.

**Indicators are useful ways to measure intended changes.** For example, the specific means of verification identified in the Benchmarks document itself represent intended standards that HCs and HCT members should meet in order to implement the Benchmarks. As such these can constitute useful indicators of change when compared to the baseline self-assessment undertaken by HCs at the start of the Benchmark implementation process.

**Domains of change are useful ways to measure unintended changes.** The open-ended nature of domains of change allows them to capture unanticipated changes in the ways that HCs and HCT members are operating that can contribute to Benchmark implementation. For example, by measuring changes in the use of protection risk analysis for decision-making, changes may emerge that were not anticipated by the Benchmarks themselves, for example regarding the integration of community-based feedback and learning about protection risks into decision-making processes.

By bringing together information from both specific indicators measuring anticipated change and wider information from the domains of change, the Measurement framework should respond to the complex

and dynamic nature of systems change at this level. Triangulating information from each of these sources should help to provide a nuanced and detailed picture of ***how the HCT has contributed*** to Benchmark implementation, as opposed to simply measuring the degree to which the Benchmarks have been met.

The following table presents some examples of useful indicators and domains of change for measuring the implementation of the Benchmarks. But it is important that protection analysis teams design context-specific indicators and domains of change of relevance to the context-specific theory of change they develop for each protection action plan.

| Measure | What it is useful for |
|---|---|
| **Indicators** | |
| Existence of an explicit (public or HCT internal) protection analysis that is included and informs the Humanitarian Needs Assessment (HNO) and includes:<br>(i) data on prioritized protection risks disaggregated by the risk equation<br>(ii) information collated from a wide range of actors including those outside the HCT that inform the analysis of the risk<br>(iii) integration of relevant national and international law | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #1.** |
| Inclusion of priority protection risks and accompanying outcomes to be achieved as a Strategic Objective in the public Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), HCT Compact (where present) or internal protection action plan. | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #1.** |
| Existence of a dedicated interagency and multi-disciplinary analytical team providing regular updates to HCT on protection risks. | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #1.** |
| Number of instances where HCT decision-making has been demonstrably based on protection analysis provided. | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #1.** |
| Development of a context-specific national Theory of Change for each priority protection risk in the protection action plan. | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #2.** |
| Integration of relevant national and international law in the basis for the HRP or HCT protection action plan | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #2.** |
| HRP or protection action plan clearly outline intended contributions per relevant cluster to reducing priority risks | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #2.** |
| HRP or protection action plan provide clear description of how the HCT will engage with relevant human rights, development, and/or peace building mechanisms | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #2.** |

| Measure | What it is useful for |
|---|---|
| HRP or protection action plan clearly identify capacity gaps and action taken to address them | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #2.** |
| HRP or protection action plan identify partners and modes of engagement | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #2.** |
| Examples of coordination and collaboration, both formal and informal, with non-HCT actors during the implementation of the HRP and protection action plan | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #2.** |
| Existence of a clear, context-specific, Measurement framework that aligns with the context-specific ToC per protection risk and is accompanied with associated data collection and analysis system | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #3.** |
| Number of instances of the HRP or protection action plan being adapted in response to interim results documented through the Measurement framework | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #3.** |
| System in place for annual reporting of results achieved as documented by the MEAL system | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #3.** |
| Existence of a dedicated team to analyze results recorded by the MEAL system, operating under a Terms of Reference that stipulates reporting lines and responsibilities for analysis and measurement of results in support of protection outcomes. | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #3.** |
| Clear articulation within the context-specific country Theories of Change of the specific pathways to reducing threat, vulnerability and increasing capacity, while outlining causal assumptions for each pathway. | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #3.** |
| Inclusion of contributions to collective HCT progress against protection priorities as a performance assessment criterion for HCs and heads of HCT member organizations | Measuring the extent to which the HCT has met **Benchmark #3.** |
| **Domains of change** | |
| Use of protection risk analysis in HCT decision-making around programming and delivery during the implementation of the protection action plan | Understanding how protection risk analysis is being conducted and used |
| Engagement with non-HCT actors in activities targeting priority protection risks identified in the protection risk analysis | Understanding how external actors and humanitarian actors have been leveraged and involved in the effort to reduce protection risk |

| Measure | What it is useful for |
|---|---|
| Active coordination and information share between HCT members on protection risk analysis, program design, implementation and monitoring | Documenting the ways in which a whole-of-system approach has been deployed to implement the protection action plan |
| Use of the risk equation and Theories of Change to identify pathways of change for each component (threat, vulnerability and capacity) or each priority protection risk. | Understanding how comprehensively the priority protection risks are being tackled and establishing the basis for clear evidence regarding how the risks have been reduced over time. |
| Design and adaptations of the protection action plan | Understanding the factors feeding into the design of the protection action plan and whether/how it has been adapted according to documented changes in context or protection risk |
| Use of community-feedback and co-design of protection strategies and activities | Documenting how the HC and HCT have prioritized community-based design of protection activities |

## OUTCOME-LEVEL INDICATORS AND DOMAINS OF CHANGE

In order to facilitate broad-based measurements of changes at community level, this framework also presents example indicators and domains of change at outcome level:

- **Indicators:** for example, the number of civilians per 100,000 living in a specific community that are killed or injured by violence, conflict or natural hazards in a six-month period.

- **Domains of change:** domains of change specify the area of community life in which a change might be observed. For example, changes in the behavior or attitudes of members of an armed group towards a civilian population at risk of violence from them. As with output-level domains of change, this domain of change specifies the area of community life of interest for evaluation (i.e. behavior of armed actors towards civilians) but does not specify the specific change as an indicator would (e.g. a 50% reduction in reported instances of coercion against civilians). The open-ended nature of the domain of change will allow analysis of protection risk patterns that might not have been explicitly anticipated, such as changes in the way the armed actors engage with community leaders or reported behavior at checkpoints towards family groups.

**Bundling together information from indicators and domains of change can help to better understand the changes in protection risk patterns observed.** No single indicator or domain of change can ever give a sufficient picture of the rich and nuanced patterns of changing risk in the lives of people living through crisis.

For example, once indicators and domains of change have been identified and risk analysis has begun, the protection analysis team might identify areas where their protection analysis can inform the design and implementation of the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF) mechanism.[5] Once this is done, combining the data from the JIAF risk analysis, and the protection risk analysis, should help to build a rich and nuanced picture of the changes in protection risks faced by community members.

Thus, by tying together, or "bundling", information from multiple sources, indicators, domains of change, the measurement framework should build up a picture of how the different components of risk are changing (threat, vulnerability and capacity) rather than simply counting instances of protection violations. This should help the protection analysis team respond to the complex and dynamic nature of protection work.

The following table presents some examples of useful indicators and domains of change for measuring the implementation of the Benchmarks and their outcomes on communities. But it is important that protection analysis teams design context-specific indicators and domains of change of relevance to the context-specific theory of change they develop for each protection action plan.

5 **https://globalprotectioncluster.org/publications/1499/policy-and-guidance/tool-toolkit/2023-jiaf-20-indicators-and-reference-table**

| Measure | What it is useful for |
|---|---|
| **Indicators** | |
| Number of civilians (per 100,000) killed or injured by violence | Measuring changes in **protection risk patterns** regarding civilian death or injury in conflict contexts. |
| % of population in sites/communities reporting protection incidents | Measuring changes in **protection risk patterns**. |
| Number of children (per 1,000) recruited by armed groups | Measuring changes in **protection risk patterns** regarding child protection |
| Percentage of separated and unaccompanied children reunited with family | Measuring changes in **protection risk patterns** regarding child protection |
| Size and location of contaminated areas released, explosive ordnance destroyed and beneficiaries thereof | Measuring changes in **threat patterns** regarding civilian death or injury in conflict contexts. |
| Number of suspected hazardous areas surveyed and cleared of explosive ordnance | Measuring changes in **threat patterns** regarding civilian death or injury in conflict contexts. |
| Number of households whose members' freedom of movement or normal activities are no longer prevented by the presence of an explosive ordnance or threat, real or perceived, following explosive ordnance disposal sport task activities | Measuring changes in **vulnerability patterns** regarding civilian death or injury in conflict contexts |
| Number of persons receiving (or have received) explosive ordnance risk education | Measuring changes in **capacity patterns** regarding civilian death or injury in conflict contexts |
| Number of persons who have received victim assistance services | Measuring changes in **vulnerability patterns** regarding civilian death or injury in conflict contexts |
| % population reporting housing, land and property (HLP) disputes | Measuring changes in patterns of **vulnerability** regarding HLP rights. |
| #attacked health facilities, schools, religious institutions, or other public/community infrastructures | Measuring changes in **protection risk patterns** regarding attacks on civilian infrastructure in conflict contexts. |
| % household members reporting instances of intimate partner violence | Measuring changes in **protection risk patterns** specific to gender-based violence. |
| % of population in sites/communities reporting inability to safely access humanitarian assistance due to threat of violence against them by an armed group | Measuring changes in patterns of **vulnerability to protection risk**. |

| Measure | What it is useful for |
|---|---|
| **Domains of change** | |
| Perceptions of safety among persons and groups identified as vulnerable to priority protection risks | Measuring unanticipated changes in **vulnerability** risk patterns among groups identified as vulnerable to priority protection risks in the HRP/HNO |
| Examples of expressed vulnerability to specific priority protection risks | Measuring unanticipated changes in **vulnerability** risk patterns among groups identified as vulnerable to priority protection risks in the HRP/HNO |
| Threatening behaviors or attitudes displayed by threat actors associated with specific priority protection risks, e.g. behavior of soldiers and armed actors towards civilians of a specific ethnic group | Measuring unanticipated changes in risk patterns among groups identified as **threats** to priority protection risks in the HRP/HNO |
| Community capacities to prevent or mitigate priority protection risks, e.g. violence monitoring activities carried out by displaced community groups | Measuring unanticipated changes in **community mitigation/prevention capacities** related to priority protection risks identified in the HRP/HNO |
| Changes in the perceived balance of power between perpetrators of priority protection risk violations and associated vulnerable persons/groups | Measuring unanticipated changes in **risk patterns** related to priority protection risks identified in the HRP/HNO |
| Changes in knowledge, attitude and behavior of duty bearers regarding priority protection risks | Measuring unanticipated changes in **risk patterns** related to priority protection risks identified in the HRP/HNO |
| Attitudes and behavior of threat actors towards priority protection risk violations, e.g. attitudes of soldiers towards gender-based violence in conflict | Measuring unanticipated changes in **threat patterns** related to priority protection risks identified in the HRP/HNO |
| Community experiences and perceptions of armed actor groups in their area | Measuring unanticipated changes in **vulnerability** risk patterns among groups identified as vulnerable to priority protection risks in the HRP/HNO |

# OVERVIEW OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS APPROACHES

The following section provides a selection of possible data collection and analysis approaches for use when collecting data against the domains of change identified above. The approaches are intended to be considered as a toolbox, from which protection analysis teams can select the most appropriate tool(s) for their data needs. Possible data sources, responsibilities for data collection, frequency of measurement and approaches to analyze HCT contributions are presented for each step of the tools described.

No single data collection tool or approach can be used in all circumstances. Tools should be selected on the basis of their ability to provide the data required to respond to the indicators and domains of change identified in the Measurement framework. In most instances, this will mean using some but not all of the data collection tools. And in all instances, it should mean varying data sources as widely as possible, particularly regarding non-HCT sources.

There are three main data collection approaches that can be used to collect information for the domains of change:

- **Most significant change**
- **Outcome harvesting**
- **Results journals**

The following information presents each approach in brief, with the step-by-step guide presented in the subsequent section. Further information and additional reading can also be found in the InterAction GBV Prevention Results-Based Evaluation Framework. This framework was developed through a piloting phase which involved multiple organizations implementing the framework across six different humanitarian contexts. This process supported a tailored development of the methods and tools outlined above to suit the needs of humanitarian organizations tackling difficult and sensitive protection risks in conflicts, post-conflict settings, and other situations of violence.

It should be noted that, for each of these tools, protection analysis teams should be prepared to identify either specialists MEAL teams who have the responsibility to collect the data using the methodological principles outlined below, or program teams who are in a position to do so instead. The choice between MEAL and program team data collection should be made on the basis of the sensitivity of the data collection process, and the importance of having a continued community presence prior to data collection. Results journals, for instance, can often be implemented using program teams working alongside community members. This allows the team members to leverage trust established through continued community presence to ensure more regular and honest reporting by community members. In this case, it is advisable for MEAL teams to coordinate with program teams to ensure that

(i) the methodological principles outlined below are respected during data collection; and

(ii) the anonymity of individual community members is respected during data analysis and use.

Before using any of the tools below, it is important to first identify the key domains of change at both

output and outcome level, that is, the areas of interest for measurement of changes in both HCT practices and protection risk patterns related to the priority protection risks identified in the protection action plan. Details of how to do this are provided in the step-by-step guide.

## DATA COLLECTION APPROACHES

### Most significant change

Most significant change (MSC) is a method for asking about change in the community. It is indicator-free and intended for use when unintended consequences are common and important for understanding the results of an intervention. As such, it is well suited to collecting information relating to the domains of change described above.

It works by conducting interviews or focus groups with HCT members and other protection actors (at output level) and community members (at outcome level) asking community, and in each case asking them to describe the most significant changes they have observed in relation to the domain of change being measured over a prior time-interval, e.g. one or two months. This allows the measurement team to capture a wide range of changes in the practices of HCT members and the lives of communities which are relevant to the implementation of the Benchmarks but may not have been anticipated during the design of the protection action plan. Asking interviewees to provide the "most significant" change they have observed introduces a degree of community-based evaluation, whereby interviewees are already selecting changes that are of most importance to them, among the many changes they may have seen. As such, this tool allows for an element of participatory evaluation to be introduced into the measurement framework.

### Outcome harvesting

Outcome Harvesting is an approach for identifying, formulating, verifying, analysing and interpreting outcomes in contexts where the relationship between the activity conducted by, for example, HCT members and the effect it has on protection risk is unclear. It is designed to capture all relevant changes observed, regardless of whether or not they match the specific intended changes described in a theory of change and then work backwards to establish contributions made towards the outcomes observed. As such, it has potential value in complex or dynamic settings such as those in which protection action plans are implemented.

It works by developing many short concise statements of who has changed what, where and when, as well as the contribution of the protection action plan towards the changes observed. Data is typically collected in the first instance from secondary sources, such as monitoring documents or community-feedback sessions. It is then refined and verified through a sampling approach involving interviews with key stakeholders in the protection system (output level) and community (outcome level). Outcome harvesting is typically conducted by an external evaluation expert in order to facilitate open-sharing of views by key stakeholders and community members.

### Results journals

A results journal is a tool for collecting data about behavior change over time. What makes it a journal is the use of a community-based record of changes over time. What makes it a results journal is the focus

on behavior changes within the community itself; rather than recording progress in delivering a set of activities. Typically, the journals collect instances of change in the behaviors and attitudes that underpin the outcomes being sought. For example, if you aim to collect information about coordination between HCT members, you might use a results journal to record open-ended information about meetings held between HCT members, examples of information sharing, or instances where collaboration has been discussed or acted upon by HCT members. Results journals can be recorded by HCs, HCT members, other protection actors, or even community members themselves.

## ANALYZING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE HCT TO THE OUTCOMES OBSERVED

Once output and outcome data has been collected against the key domains of change of interest, the protection analysis team should compare this against information about external factors observed to provide an analysis of the contribution that the HCT has made to the changes in the protection risk patterns observed. This is important do to so that protection action plans can be adapted on the basis of a contextualised understanding of how the activities undertaken to date are interacting with the wider context in altering the protection risks as they evolve over time.

The simplest way to do this is to:

(i) list each of the outcomes identified by the data collection tools deployed

(ii) for each outcome listed, identify the evidence in favour of the claim that HCT activities contributed to it

(iii) for each outcome listed, identify the evidence in favour of the claim that external factors contributed to it

(iv) build a contribution story outlining the ways in which both HCT activities and external factors interacted to change the protection risk in question.

An example template for steps (i) – (iii) is presented below:

| Domain of change | Outcome observed | Contributory activities | Evidence of activity contribution | External factors | Evidence of external factor contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Behavior of soldiers toward civilians (threats) | Reduced patrolling near IDP camps at dusk | Advocacy towards leaders of armed group following community consultation | Measurement framework output indicators Contribution statements collected via outcome harvest | None observed | |
| | Increased commitments by armed actors to uphold IHL | IHL training of armed group | HCT member agency monitoring reports | Instance of a nearby armed group being held to account for IHL violations | Media reports and results journals |
| Use of early/ forced marriage in response household food insecurity (vulnerabilities) | Decreased acceptance of early/forced marriage among community household heads | GBV risk awareness-raising activities | AAP feedback data | None observed | |
| | Decreased reports of early/forced marriage in the community | GBV risk awareness-raising activities | Results journals collected by HCT member X | Decreased food insecurity resulting from good harvests | Most significant change data and IPC classifications |
| Community group ability to monitor risks of violence committed against them by armed actors in their area (capacities) | Increased number of community risk monitoring groups | None observed | | Change in community leadership and prioritisation of protection risk | Media reports |
| | Increased incidence of community leaders responding to risks raised by monitoring groups | None observed | | Change in community leadership and prioritisation of protection risk | Media reports |

Using this analysis, the protection analysis team should draw conclusions regarding the ways in which both activities listed in the protection action plan and external factors have worked together to change the priority protection risks identified in the HRP/HNO. This should include identifying any areas where the protection action plan could be adapted to better engage external factors or to overcome external constraints.

In the example above, this might include:

- Updating IHL training to highlight the negative consequences seen for the armed actors who were held to account for violations
- Adapting GBV risk awareness sessions to embed learning about the positive effects observed since food insecurity dropped
- Starting activities that help support and maintain community groups to improve and embed protection risk monitoring

The final analytical report should then use these as a basis for recommendations on revising the protection action plan.

# ANNEX I: PROTECTION RISK ANALYSIS CANVAS

## Risk

*In one bullet point, identify one prioritized protection risk (violence, coercion, or deliberate deprivation) that is occurring in this crisis. (For example, recruitment of child soldiers, sexual assault at checkpoints, indiscriminate bombing, kidnapping of men, denial of aid to ethnic minorities in the country). Be as specific as possible.*

•

## Population

*Describe the key characteristics of the population(s) at risk (Please choose a location and/or a community to focus the discussion)*

## Context

*What are the 3-5 most important contextual issues for the analysis (previous issues, current events, historical background)*

## Analysis

| Threat (perpetrator) | Vulnerability | Capacity |
|---|---|---|
| *Who is the threat? What are the drivers/motivations/resources of this threat that is creating the risk? If there is more than one threat actor perpetrating this risk, separate these out.* | *What makes the population at risk vulnerable to this threat?* | *What are the capacities the population at risk have that help them overcome this threat?* |

| Scenario | | |
|---|---|---|
| | **Scenario** | **Triggers** |
| **Worst Case** | *Describe 3-5 bullets the worst way in which the situation could evolve* | *What are the events that might make this happen?* |
| **Best Case** | *Describe with 3-5 bullets the most positive way in which the situation could evolve* | *What are the events that might make this happen?* |
| **Most Likely** | *Describe with 3-5 bullets the most likely way in which the situation could evolve* | *What are the events that might make this happen?* |

| Mitigation | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Reduce Threat ↓** | **Reduce Vulnerability ↓** | **Increase Capacity ↑** |
| *What can we do to reduce the threat (3-5 bullets)* | *What can we do to reduce vulnerability (3-5 bullets)* | *How do we increase the capacity of the population at risk (3-5 bullets)* |

# ANNEX II:
# EXAMPLE 1: INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS AND CIVILIAN OBJECTS

In this context the HCT has a country-wide CoP strategy action plan in place for the period January 2024–December 2025. It builds upon previous CoP strategies developed in 2022 and 2023, which identified two major categories of protection risk:

(i) **Indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects,** including the use of unexploded ordnance, IEDs, and the use of large-scale military offenses, result in civilian deaths, injuries, and destruction to civilian objects and infrastructure (e.g., water towers, medical centers, and roads).

(ii) **Sexual trafficking of young girls living and working in rural mining areas controlled by NSAGs**

The HCT has two key institutional factors that support the Centrality of Protection implementation process:

(i) **A CoP Implementation Support Group (ISG).** This group is comprised of HCT members with a particular mandate or pre-existing engagement with protection issues inside the country. The ISG is chaired by OCHA.

(ii) **A ProCap** who is already working closely with the ISG chair and the Humanitarian Coordinator. TheProCap has engaged significantly with multiple sectors to support intersectoral protection analysis using community-based engagement and methods.

The following information presents a Risk Canvas that briefly captures the protection analysis and includes a national-level theory of change for addressing the protection risk: indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects. It uses the core components of the risk equation to demonstrate pathways for bringing about change as it relates to changing the behavior/actions of the threat actors, reducing vulnerabilities, and enhancing existing capacities.

## PROTECTION RISK CANVAS

### Risk

*In one bullet point, identify one prioritized protection risk (violence, coercion, or deliberate deprivation) occurring in this crisis.*

- **Indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects, including the use of unexploded ordnance, IEDs, and the use of large-scale military offenses, result in civilian deaths, injuries, and destruction to civilian objects and infrastructure (e.g., water towers, medical centers, and roads).**

### Population

*Describe the key characteristics of the population(s) at risk (Please choose a location and/or a community to focus the analysis and planning)*

- The population under severe risk includes an ethnic indigenous group that lives on the outskirts of the Capital city.
- The community members in this region are neither members of the Clan of the opposition group nor the governing party. They are a minority indigenous group caught in the fighting.
- The land they reside on is desired by both parties to the conflict because it is rich in minerals, and the river that runs through the community is a direct link to waterways for shipping.
- Most of the community relies on agricultural activities such as farming and raising animals for income. However, a major river runs through several communities, and this is a source of fisheries and transportation of goods for many people.
- Communities have traditional governing systems set up with local religious leaders, although they do participate in state-run political systems.
- They frequently travel into the city to sell their goods.
- While military operations are increasingly getting closer to the city, much of the fighting continues to take place outside. The communities further from the city borders have experienced heavy fighting, with communities closer often experiencing suicidal bombings or the use of IEDs.

### Context

*What are the 3-5 most important contextual issues for the analysis (previous issues, current events, historical background)*

- This land has been historically disputed due to the significance of the river that serves as a crucial waterway and trade route.
- During the first civil war 35 years ago, this land was controlled by the ethnic Minority Clan (the Rebel Group), although they were pushed back when the war ended and the current Government came into power.
- While there are factional splits within the indigenous communities, most of the people living on the land do not support either side of the conflict.

## Analysis

| Threat (perpetrator) | Vulnerability | Capacity |
|---|---|---|
| *Who is the threat? What are the drivers/motivations/resources of this threat that is creating the risk?*<br><br>There are two threat actors: the Rebel Opposition group and the Government Forces; they have different tactics, motivations, chains of command<br><br>**Rebel Opposition Group**<br>• Represents the most prominent minority Clan and seeking independence<br>• Have a large diaspora overseas that provides funds and weapons in support of their cause<br>• They have various forms of weapons, including the use of IEDs, missiles, guns, and other artillery<br>• Soldiers follow orders from a field commander who reports up the chain; despite this, soldiers and commanders often make their own decisions; there are little repercussions for harming civilians<br>• The group has also engaged in suicide bombings in crowded areas.<br>• There is a political wing of the Opposition Group that influences the militia group<br>• Has gained some control of territory, specifically along important trade routes<br>• Little knowledge of IHL<br><br>**Government Forces**<br>• Represents the majority ethnic population, although says it is for all the people in the country<br>• Policies have favored the ethnic majority, and there are discriminatory policies that affect ethnic minorities | *What makes the population at risk vulnerable to the this threat?*<br><br>**The threat of the Rebel Opposition Group**<br>• On several occasions, there have been suicide bombings on boats that pass through the towns into government-controlled areas, resulting in the deaths of fishermen and children playing in the waterways. Families relying on the water for income sources are at an extreme risk.<br>• Families and communities that have not put in place early warning systems or shelters during military activities are caught in the crossfire<br>• Towns or communities that the Rebel Group views as siding with the Government<br><br>**The threat of Government Forces**<br>• People traveling on the road in unmarked vehicles into the city to sell their goods can be mistaken for enemy vehicles and bombed or fired upon.<br>• Women and youth that work in the fields, and children that play, are at risk of landmines and UXOs.<br>• Families and communities that have not put in place early warning systems or shelters during military activities are caught in the crossfire | *What are the capacities the population at risk have that help them overcome this threat?*<br><br>**Capacities to overcome threat by Rebel Opposition Group**<br>• Community leadership able to negotiate with Rebel Opposition Group to ensure specific infrastructure is not attacked or bombed<br>• Some towns have built bomb shelters in schools and religious centers<br>• In one community there is an underground warning system that activates when Rebel or Govt. forces are near<br><br>**Capacities to overcome threat by Government Forces:**<br>• Community leaders able to influence Govt. officials to block the use of landmines within a certain range of towns and farmland<br>• Some towns have built bomb shelters in schools and religious centers<br>• In one community there is an underground warning system that activates when Rebel or Govt. forces are near |

| Analysis | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Threat (perpetrator)** | **Vulnerability** | **Capacity** |
| • The President and head of the Military often do not agree with defensive tactics with the Military conducting operations haphazardly<br>• Large military that includes several command units<br>• Use of artillery, IEDs, missiles, aviation to drop bombs<br>• The military also uses landmines as a deterrent and form of protection around the outskirts of major cities<br>• Is backed and militarily supported by neighboring states but not supported by big nation-states including several European nations<br>• Views other ethnic minority clans favoring the opposition resulting in decisions and attacks in areas harming civilians and infrastructure<br>• While on its territory, it has taken extraordinary measures to ensure the waterway is blocked off from the Rebel Group. This has meant bombing and conducting military operations in and around these areas.<br>• Soldiers are trained in IHL; but this is not always adhered to. | | |

| Scenario | | |
|---|---|---|
| | **Scenario** | **Triggers and Assumptions** |
| **Worst Case** | *Describe 3-5 bullets the worst way in which the situation could evolve*<br>• Both threat actors continue to conduct military operations within and around the Indigenous communities, destroying all infrastructure and causing significant causalities/deaths | *What are the events that might make this happen?*<br>• Continued backing of military aid to the Rebel Group by diaspora<br>• Continued backing of military aid by Neighboring States<br>• Major attack within the Capital city resulting in retribution<br>• Increasing terrorist attacks |
| **Best Case** | *Describe with 3-5 bullets the most positive way in which the situation could evolve*<br>• Ceasefire with peace negotiations<br>• Both militaries adhere to IHL, protecting civilians and civilian infrastructure | *What are the events that might make this happen?*<br>• Outside nation-states have influence to bring both sides together to negotiate<br>• Concerns are heard, and solutions are identified to end fighting<br>• Diaspora and other states providing military support withhold military aid due to outside political pressure and public protests. (This assumes such pressure can be effective in stopping the flow of military aid)<br>• Condemnation of the lack of adherence to IHL on the political stage puts pressure on both parties to restrain indiscriminate attacks (This assumes such pressure will influence behaviors) |
| **Most Likely** | *Describe with 3-5 bullets the most likely way in which the situation could evolve*<br>• Fighting continues, but interventions could minimize civilian harm and damage to civilian infrastructure<br>• Without immediate support, communities are most likely to flee forcing them to be internally displaced without food, shelter, or other basic needs | *What are the events that might make this happen?*<br>• Engagement with both armed groups on IHL is effective in helping to shift how each party carries out attacks<br>• Naming and shaming helps to put pressure on armed groups to minimize their attacks on civilians; mass public protests within and outside the state<br>• Humanitarians begin to provide assistance in response to possible displacement |

## Mitigation

| Reduce Threat ↓ | Reduce Vulnerability ↓ | Increase Capacity ↑ |
|---|---|---|
| *What can we do to reduce the threat (3-5 bullets)* | *What can we do to reduce vulnerability (3-5 bullets)* | *How do we increase the capacity of the population at risk (3-5 bullets)* |
| **Changing Behavior of Rebel Opposition Group**<br>• (Humanitarians) Begin negotiations and discussions about protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure<br>• (Humanitarians) Introduce IHL<br>• (Development Actors, Peace Builders) Work with community leaders of Indigenous communities that have established relationships with Rebel forces to identify strategies to minimize harm within the population<br>• (Human Rights Groups) Advocacy efforts targeting the Diaspora to stop military support upon conditions of changing conduct<br>• (Diplomatic/State Actors) Engage with the political wing of the opposition to understand points of influence<br>• Engage with commanders about how to recognize the movement of civilian vehicles to minimize attacks on civilians<br><br>**Change Behavior the Government Forces**<br>• (Humanitarians) Begin negotiations and discussions about Protection of Civilians and civilian infrastructure<br>• (Humanitarians & Human Rights Groups) Reinforce IHL and identify mechanisms to hold government accountable<br>• (Development Actors, Peace Builders) Work with community leaders of indigenous communities that engage within the state's political system to identify strategies to minimize harm within the population | **Actions to reduce the vulnerability of the Rebel Opposition Group**<br>• (Humanitarians) Support families and communities to identify safe havens, bomb shelters, and other places where they can be shielded from attacks<br>• (Humanitarians) Work with community leaders to develop warning systems that can observe the movement of armed groups, their activities, and how to alert families and members of the community<br>• (Development Actors) Offer alternative livelihood options, especially to fisherman and those working in agriculture, where the risk of attacks is greatest<br>• (Humanitarians) Support efforts to help clearly identify civilian vehicles and infrastructure<br>• (Humanitarians, Development Actors, Media) Prepare information/communication about safety measures, risks, support services if people flee<br><br>**Actions to reduce vulnerability of Government Forces:**<br>• (Humanitarians) Raise awareness about landmines<br>• (Humanitarians) Support families and communities to identify safe havens, bomb shelters, and other places where they can be shielded from attacks | **Actions to enhance existing capacities within the community against civilian attacks due to both armed actors**<br>• (Peace Builders) Work with indigenous leaders to enhance relationships and negotiation methods<br>• (Humanitarians) Enhance and support community-warning systems and/or help to introduce them in communities without<br>• (Humanitarians) Enhance community networks that can help communicate risks<br>• (Development Actors) Work with communities to introduce interim livelihood options<br>• (Diplomatic Actors) Work with government to establish safe passageways for civilians to enter city without risk of being targets |

| Mitigation | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Reduce Threat ↓** | **Reduce Vulnerability ↓** | **Increase Capacity ↑** |
| • (Human Rights Groups) Advocate to remove and stop the use of landmines<br>• (Human Rights Groups) Advocate and mobilize public pressure within Neighboring States to influence the stop to the crisis.<br>• (Diplomatic Actors) Diplomatic pressures on Neighboring states to withhold military aid to Government<br>• (Humanitarians) Engage with commanders about how to recognize the movement of civilian vehicles to minimize attacks on civilians | • (Humanitarians) Work with community leaders to develop warning systems that can observe the movement of armed groups, their activities, and how to alert families and members of the community<br>• (Humanitarians) Support efforts to help clearly identify civilian vehicles and infrastructure<br>• (Humanitarians, Development Actors, Media) Prepare information/communication about safety measures, risks, support services if people flee | |

## POTENTIAL THEORY OF CHANGE TO REDUCE THIS RISK



## MEASUREMENT OPTIONS

The following measurement options have been tailored to the theory of change presented above and selected on the basis of their potential for providing the most useful information within the constraints faced by ISG member agencies for data collection.

The key possible challenges observed include:

- **Insecurity and Access:** ongoing conflict may limit access to affected areas, necessitating remote data collection methods.
- **Fragmented Governance:** weak local institutions and competing community dynamics can hinder the collection of reliable data.

To mitigate these challenges, the following recommendations have been identified for the protection results measurement:

- **Adopt Participatory Approaches:** engage communities in designing and implementing data collection tools, ensuring inclusion of marginalized groups.
- **Prioritize Real-Time Monitoring:** use digital platforms where possible to collect and analyze incident data in real-time, enabling rapid response to emerging risks.
- **Focus on Qualitative Insights:** complement quantitative data with qualitative tools like Most-Significant Change stories to understand nuanced changes in protection risks.
- **Leverage Existing Systems:** strengthen and expand current protection monitoring and complaint mechanisms, ensuring they are accessible to all affected groups.

On the basis of these considerations, the following options have been developed for data collection at community-level, against the intended results in the Theory of Change presented above:

| Risk Component | |
|---|---|
| **Risk from Government Forces** | |
| **Threat** | **INDICATORS:**<br>1. # instances reported by community members of Government Forces violating IHL (including violations of Principles of Distinction, Proportionality, Precaution, Military Necessity, Indiscriminate Attack, or Attacking Civilian Objects)<br>2. # civilian casualties and injuries due to suicide attacks and UXOs.<br>3. % reduction in foreign military assistance for the Government<br><br>**DOMAINS OF CHANGE:**<br>4. Behavior of Government Forces towards civilians<br>5. Intensity of operations near civilian infrastructure |
| **Vulnerability** | **INDICATORS:**<br>6. # civilian vehicles marked<br>7. # acres of agricultural land cleared of UXO<br>8. # shelters made accessible to communities<br><br>**DOMAINS OF CHANGE:**<br>9. Community perceptions of vulnerability to attack by Government Forces |
| **Risk from Government Forces & Rebel Group** | |
| **Capacity** | **INDICATORS:**<br>10. # community-reported instances of dialogue between community leaders and armed groups (both Government and Rebel)<br>11. # community-reported instances of community systems activating warnings for community members<br>12. $ value change in non-riverine income sources among community members<br><br>**DOMAINS OF CHANGE:**<br>13. Negotiations between community leaders and armed groups (both Government and Rebel)<br>14. Presence and activity of community warning systems<br>15. Viability of non-riverine livelihood options |
| **Risk from Rebel Group** | |
| **Vulnerability** | **INDICATORS:**<br>16. # civilian vehicles marked<br>17. # community-reported instances of community systems activating warnings for community members<br><br>**DOMAINS OF CHANGE:**<br>18. Community perceptions of vulnerability to attack by Rebel Group |

| Risk Component | |
|---|---|
| **Threat** | **INDICATORS:**<br>• # instances reported by community members of Revel Groups violating IHL (including violations of Principles of Distinction, Proportionality, Precaution, Military Necessity, Indiscriminate Attack, or Attacking Civilian Objects)<br><br>**DOMAINS OF CHANGE:**<br>• Behavior of Rebel Groups towards civilians<br>• Intensity of operations near civilian infrastructure |
| **Data Collection Approaches** | |
| | • **Protection Monitoring:** Regular reporting by the protection cluster and partners on incidents of violence or threats against civilians.<br>• **Outcome Harvesting:** Track reductions in civilian casualties and map changes in behaviours of armed actors after advocacy and training sessions.<br>• **Community Perception Surveys:** Gather feedback from affected communities on perceived changes in safety and security.<br>• **Remote Sensing and Mapping:** Use satellite imagery and incident databases to document destruction of civilian infrastructure.<br>• **Participatory Needs Assessments:** Engage community committees to identify vulnerabilities.<br>• **Results Journals:** Track changes in vulnerabilities.<br>• **Key Informant Interviews (KIIs):** Conduct interviews with affected populations, humanitarian actors, and local authorities.<br>• **Community Feedback Mechanisms:** Establish complaint and feedback systems to assess barriers to accessing assistance.<br>• **Most Significant Change (MSC) Stories:** Document how strengthened community capacities have mitigated specific risks.<br>• **Governance Assessments:** Evaluate the effectiveness of local conflict resolution and protection systems. |
| **Cross-Cutting Approaches** | |
| | • **Protection Risk Analysis Updates:** continuously update protection risk profiles using community inputs and monitoring data to assess shifts in threats, vulnerabilities, and capacities.<br>• **Integrated Monitoring Frameworks:** collaborate with other sectors (e.g., shelter, food security) to measure cross-sectoral impacts on protection outcomes.<br>• **Geo-Referenced Incident Tracking:** use tools like GIS to map incidents of attacks and their proximity to military operations or contested areas.<br>• **Explosive Hazard Risk Education Monitoring:** track the effectiveness of mine risk education campaigns through pre- and post-training surveys. |

| Risk Component | |
|---|---|
| **Stakeholders and Data Sources** | |
| | • **Community-Based Protection Committees:** Act as focal points for data collection and monitoring.<br>• **Protection Cluster and Sub-Clusters:** Provide technical guidance and coordinate reporting mechanisms.<br>• **National and International NGOs:** Conduct perception surveys and MSC interviews in hard-to-reach areas.<br>• **UN and Government Partners:** Monitor compliance with IHL and coordinate explosive ordnance clearance<br>• **Peace-building, development and diplomatic actors:** Provide data on activities undertaken within the Theory of Change and results achieved |

# ANNEX III:
# EXAMPLE II: SEXUAL TRAFFICKING OF YOUNG GIRLS BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS (NSAG)

## PROTECTION RISK CANVAS

### Risk

*In one bullet point, identify one protection risks (violence, coercion, or deliberate deprivation) that is occurring in this crisis. (For example, recruitment of child soldiers, sexual assault at checkpoints, indiscriminate bombing, kidnapping of men, denial of aid to ethnic minorities in the country)*

- **Sexual trafficking of young girls living and working in rural mining areas controlled by NSAGs**

### Population

*Describe the key characteristics of the population(s) at risk (Please choose a location and/or a community to focus the discussion)*

- The country is rich in minerals in the mountain areas and also within riverbeds and water sources. Mining is the predominant source of income for people living in these areas.
- Both women and men work in the mines, leaving children back home in the care of the elderly or youth.
- In recent months, many of the mountain towns and communities living near major water sources (rivers) have been taken over by opposition groups or non-state armed groups.
- The majority of people living in these communities are part of ethnic minority groups, some belonging to the ethnic opposition group that is fighting the government, but many people make up 53% of other ethnic groups.
- Communities have traditional governing systems with religious leaders often providing leadership and settling disputes through traditional mechanisms.

### Context

*What are the 3-5 most important contextual issues for the analysis (previous issues, current events, historical background)*

- Different ethnic groups have historically contested the mining area. For the past several years, the government was in control of most of the mining sites across the country; however, with the uprising of the ethnic opposition group, the mining communities across the country have been attacked and seen the control of the mines being taken over by the NSAGs.
- With the recent attacks across several mining areas, some families have chosen to leave their communities in search of safer locations. People are experiencing displacement and seeking alternative incomes to keep their families safe and secure.

## Analysis

| Threat (perpetrator) | Vulnerability | Capacity |
|---|---|---|
| *Who is the threat? What are the drivers/motivations/resources of this threat that is creating the risk?*<br>• NSAGs of the ethnic opposition group aim to control many mining areas across the country<br>• A sub-trafficking group has emerged within the NSAGs that is carrying out secret operations by abducting female youth for sexual exploitation.<br>• Tactics used by the sub-trafficking group are disguised as a service to support female youth to find work, to help "safely" move them to other areas of the country or outside, away from the conflict.<br>• Sub-trafficking group seems to target adolescent girls from low-income level families working in the mines and those traveling or found home alone.<br>• The underground network does not seem to be an official sub-group of the NSAG, but commanders are aware of it and turn a blind eye<br>• Girls are promised modeling jobs and international opportunities<br>• Limited government/police involvement, given the trafficking network operates in ethnic opposition areas | *What makes the population at risk vulnerable to this threat?*<br>• Adolescent girls from low-income families in the mining areas of the country<br>• Families with adolescent girls trying to flee conflict-prone areas<br>• Adolescent girls left home (not going to school) to care for the household or smaller children<br>• Limited information and awareness within communities about the risks of groups/individuals promising help or international jobs<br>• No legal repercussions<br>• Border crossings in neighboring countries are not secure or enforced. There are many routes that are used by traditional groups to sell food and other goods; people passing through are not questioned by authorities | *What are the capacities the population at risk have that help them overcome this threat?*<br>• Adolescent girls in schools or access to income generating activities<br>• Families that are income secure<br>• Families aware of risks such as trafficking happening in and around their communities<br>• Strong community leaders able to keep NSAGs away from their community through negotiations or discussions |

| Scenario | | |
|---|---|---|
| | **Scenario** | **Triggers and Assumptions** |
| **Worst Case** | *Describe 3-5 bullets the worst way in which the situation could evolve*<br>• Hundreds of girls are sexually exploited through trafficking<br>• Trafficking networks expand targeted individuals to include other children and other ethnic minorities | *What are the events that might make this happen?*<br>• The conflict worsens leaving families vulnerable without income or needing to flee<br>• The NSAG dismisses IHL and other human rights violations<br>• The NSAG profits from the underground networks fueling arms sales and other tactics that support their movement, even if it is at the cost of lives. |
| **Best Case** | *Describe with 3-5 bullets the most positive way in which the situation could evolve*<br>• NSAGs acknowledge the sub-group trafficking young girls and shut it down<br>• Commanders of NSAGs put in place disciplinary measures for members of the NSAGs involved in any illegal activity, noting it harms the movement<br>• Families affected are compensated | *What are the events that might make this happen?*<br>• NSAGs recognize the importance of being seen as a respected organization/ eventually state party within the international arena<br>• NSAGs are open to collaboration and negotiations with international humanitarian aid agencies<br>• Public outcry puts pressure on NSAGs<br>• Trafficking networks are circumvented and stopped at international borders |
| **Most Likely** | **Most likely:**<br>*Describe with 3-5 bullets the most likely way in which the situation could evolve*<br>• NSAGs are made aware of the trafficking network and some commanders take disciplinary actions to minimize such activity<br>• The trafficking network is exposed; leaders or key actors are publicly shamed; some aspects of the network collapse<br>• The trafficking network evolves to use different strategies and targets younger children for purposes of drug trafficking | *What are the events that might make this happen?*<br>• Public outcry shaming the movement<br>• International demand for narcotics; limited border control |

| Mitigation | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Reduce Threat ↓** | **Reduce Vulnerability ↓** | **Increase Capacity ↑** |
| *What can we do to reduce the threat (3-5 bullets)*<br>• (Human Rights actors) denounce the movement where illegal activities are supported by calling them human rights violations; this puts pressure on NSAG to put in place policies and/or directives to change behavior<br>• (Humanitarians) Negotiations and discussions take place with commanders of different units of NSAG to raise awareness about the trafficking networks; introduction of IHL and HR.<br>• (Humanitarians and Peace builders) Engagement with NSAGs to discuss protection risks; encouraging policy changes<br>• (Diplomats) Diplomacy efforts aim to strengthen international borders, including identification of signs of when someone may be a trafficked person | *What can we do to reduce vulnerability (3-5 bullets)*<br>• (Humanitarian & Development) Low-income families are supported with alternative livelihood activities within their communities<br>• (Humanitarian & Development) Education programs are offered to all children and youth in mining communities<br>• (Human Rights, Humanitarian, Development) Awareness campaigns<br>• (Humanitarian and Peacebuilding) Engagement with traditional leaders and other recognized leaders (including government) to reinforce laws and criminal penalties | *How do we increase the capacity of the population at risk (3-5 bullets)*<br>• (Development, Humanitarian) Enhancing safe school programs; empowering girls as advocates<br>• (Humanitarian) Building community networks that encourage children and adolescents to put in place safety measures including walking together, message/ alert trees, and other tactics used to avoid or alert when predators have been identified<br>• (Humanitarian and Peacebuilding) Leaders in the community are encouraged and supported with skills to keep their communities safe; negotiate and discuss risks with NSAGs. |

## POTENTIAL THEORY OF CHANGE TO REDUCE THIS RISK



## MEASUREMENT OPTIONS

The following measurement options could be identified through discussion with ISG members regarding the most appropriate and feasible options for community-based outcome-level data collection. The suggestions below have been tailored to the potential theory of change presented above, and selected on the basis of their potential for providing the most useful information within the constraints and opportunities faced by ISG member agencies for data collection.

| Risk Component | |
|---|---|
| **Threat** | **INDICATORS:**<br>1. # instances reported by community members of IHL violations by sub-groups.<br>2. # convictions for sexual trafficking.<br>3. # community-reported instances sexual trafficking per 100,000 people in the target communities.<br><br>**DOMAINS OF CHANGE:**<br>4. Observed changes in the behavior of sub-trafficking groups, such as fewer reports of approaches to low income adolescent girls or reduced incidents of coercion.<br>5. Perceptions of threat levels in community focus group discussions. |
| **Vulnerability** | **INDICATORS:**<br>6. # new jobs available for low income families in the community<br>7. $ value change in income among low income families<br><br>**DOMAINS OF CHANGE:**<br>8. Livelihood opportunities for adolescent girls in low income families in the community. |
| **Capacity** | **INDICATORS:**<br>9. % adolescent girls within the community in safe schools program.<br>10. # community-reported instances of leaders negotiating with NSAG on sexual trafficking risk.<br><br>**DOMAINS OF CHANGE:**<br>11. Behavior changes of community members in vulnerable times and places (e.g. walking to school in groups, reporting suspicious activity) |

| Risk Component | |
|---|---|
| **Data Collection Approaches** | • Community-based **most significant change (MSC)** interviews to document reduced harmful behaviours by threat actors.<br>• **Outcome harvesting** to track shifts in threat behaviours attributable to interventions like advocacy or awareness campaigns.<br>• **Community perception surveys:** Conducted by local NGOs or through the sub-regional protection cluster to assess vulnerability shifts.<br>• **Results journals:** Track changes in attitudes, behaviours, and vulnerabilities within communities over time.<br>• **Outcome harvesting** to document how community-led efforts or training improved protective capacities.<br>• Monitoring **progress markers** through results journals, such as increased use of safe tactics or stronger engagement in advocacy efforts. |
| **Cross-Cutting Approaches** | |
| | • **Protection Risk Analysis Updates:** continuously update protection risk profiles using community inputs and monitoring data to assess shifts in threats, vulnerabilities, and capacities.<br>• **Integrated Monitoring Frameworks:** collaborate with other sectors (e.g., shelter, food security) to measure cross-sectoral impacts on protection outcomes. |
| **Stakeholders and Data Sources** | |
| | • **Community-Based Protection Committees:** Act as focal points for data collection and monitoring.<br>• **Protection Cluster and Sub-Clusters:** Provide technical guidance and coordinate reporting mechanisms.<br>• **National and International NGOs:** Conduct perception surveys and MSC interviews in hard-to-reach areas.<br>• **Development and human rights actors:** Provide data on activities undertaken within the Theory of Change and results achieved |
| **Stakeholder Roles** | |
| **UNFPA and Local NGOs** | • Lead data collection for perception surveys and progress markers.<br>• Facilitate participatory monitoring through MSC and results journals. |
| **Protection Analysis Teams** | • Conduct ongoing analysis of risk patterns, incorporating findings into adaptive planning.<br>• Use outcome harvesting to evaluate the impact of protection interventions. |
| **Community Members** | • Provide narratives for MSC and participate in journals and surveys to measure shifts in behaviour. |

| Risk Component | |
|---|---|
| **Critical Assumptions** | |
| | • Community members are willing to engage in data collection and feedback activities despite political sensitivities.<br>• Local NGOs and UN agencies have adequate capacity to conduct surveys and manage participatory methods.<br>• Data collection tools, such as results journals and outcome harvesting, are tailored to the rural, dispersed community settings. |

# ANNEX IV: STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO DATA COLLECTION APPROACHES

The following section provides a selection of possible data collection and analysis approaches for use when collecting data against the domains of change identified above. The approaches are intended to be considered as a toolbox, from which protection analysis teams can select the most appropriate tool(s) for their data needs. Possible data sources, responsibilities for data collection, frequency of measurement and approaches to analyze HCT contributions are presented for each step of the tools described.

No single data collection tool or approach can be used in all circumstances. Tools should be selected on the basis of their ability to provide the data required to respond to the indicators and domains of change identified in the Measurement framework. In most instances, this will mean using some but not all of the data collection tools. And in all instances, it should mean varying data sources as widely as possible, particularly regarding non-HCT sources.

There are three main data collection approaches that can be used to collect information for the domains of change:

## 4.1 MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE

## 4.2 OUTCOME HARVESTING

## 4.3 RESULTS JOURNALS

The following section presents each approach in brief, but further information and additional reading can be found in the **InterAction GBV Prevention Results-Based Evaluation Framework**.[6]

### STEP 1: IDENTIFY THE DOMAINS OF CHANGE

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team | Once, as soon as the protection action plan is complete | Protection action plan, KIIs with HCT members |

To make any of the tools below useful for measuring interim results of a protection action plan, it is important that the protection analysis team first identifies the key domains of change related to the specific protection action plan in question.

Step 1 therefore involves identifying just 3 - 5 areas of community life that the protection action plan is trying to bring change to. It is important to restrict the number of domains to ensure sufficient depth to the evidence collected in each one. Each domain should relate to the intended outcomes of the action plan and the priority protection risks identified in the risk analysis. For this reason, each domain will need to be identified once the protection action plan has been completed.

6 The link to the GBV Prevention Evaluation Framework: https://protection.interaction.org/focus-areas/gbvpef/

Examples of potential domains of change can be taken and adapted from the table above, and they might include:

1. Behavior of soldiers toward civilians (threats)

2. Community experiences and perceptions of soldiers in their area (vulnerabilities)

3. Community group ability to monitor risks of violence committed against them by armed actors in their area (capacities)

It's important that these domains are "loose" and "fuzzy" compared to standard indicators. This helps you to collect stories of change that you could not necessarily predict when the protection action plan was designed. It's also vital to make sure that the domains of change are within the communities being served. Don't include things like "perceptions of our activities" or "engagement in our activities," as these are not outcomes, they are assessments of outputs.

Once these domains have been agreed, the protection analysis team and HCT members should select one, two or three of the data collection tools below in order to record interim results in each domain.

## 4.1 MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE

Most significant change (MSC) is a method for asking about change in the community. It is indicator-free, and intended for use when unintended consequences are common and important for understanding the results of an intervention. As such, it is well suited to collecting information relating to the domains of change described above.

A core principle of MSC is to prioritize community voice in describing how your activities have impacted upon them. As such, it can provide a powerful way to increase community feedback on the effects of a protection action plan.

There are 3 steps to the streamlined MSC approach in this framework, in addition to Step 1 described above:[7]

- **Step 2: Collect the stories of change**
- **Step 3: Select the most significant changes**
- **Step 4: Provide feedback**

7 The four step approach presented below has been streamlined in order to make it more practical in the time-constrained contexts of HCT operations. For details of the full and in-depth MSC approach, please see the original MSC guidebook: **https://mande.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/MSCGuide.pdf**

## STEP 2: COLLECTING THE STORIES

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team, HCT member agencies | On an ongoing basis, utilizing pre-existing community engagement and feedback mechanisms, throughout the implementation of the protection action plan | Community members through interviews and, where appropriate, focus group discussions |

This step involves collecting stories of change over time within the domains identified above. The stories are real-life examples of how an affected person's life has changed over a given period of time, with respect to the domain of change being asked about. They can be collected through interview or community focus-group (providing there is no risk of harm identified in sharing stories of change in a group setting). This should be done by leveraging pre-existing community engagement and feedback activities of HCT member agencies to collect stories related to the domains of change identified for the protection action plan, or by tasking the protection analysis team with community data collection activities related to the domains of change.

There are many different ways to construct the story templates themselves, but a common approach is presented in the example below:

| | |
|---|---|
| **Domain of change** | Behavior of soldiers toward civilians (threats) |
| **Meta-data** | Location, date, period when the story took place, profile of the storyteller |
| **Title of the story** | Ask the affected person to give a name to the story they have told you |
| **Question 1** | What changes have you seen in the last six months regarding the way that soldiers have behaved towards people in your community? |
| **Question 2** | Which one of these changes is most significant to you? |
| **Question 3** | Why is this one the most significant to you? |

This template allows the interviewer to collect basic information about the time and place were the story happened; a basic and open-ended question is asked about the most significant change observed by the interviewee. Crucially, the significance of this story to the interviewee is then explained. This allows people to share stories that may not be obviously related to protection, but which nevertheless demonstrate significance to it. For example, a soldier may report that, since taking part in an IHL awareness-raising session, his peers have stopped patrolling a certain area at night. It's only by asking the significant of this change that we might discover those particular night patrols were being used for sexual violence against civilians.

## STEP 3: SELECT THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team, HCT member agencies | On a periodic basis, for example once every three months, linked to HCT processes for reviewing and adapting the protection action plan | Stories of change identified by HCT members and the protection analysis team |

Once these stories have been collected from multiple sources by multiple enumerators, a process of selection can take place. This selection process can take many different forms, but a common one is for interviewers to select the three to five stories they collected that they consider to be most significant to their strategic objective, from all of the stories that they collected. The reasons for the selection should also be recorded. Once this is done, a second level of selection can take place. For example, if each HCT member agency had one interviewer conducting most significant change interviews for the protection action plan, and each one identified 3 - 5 stories from those they collected, the second level of selection could take place by asking peer HCT member agencies to select 1 – 2 stories from that selection. And a final level selection could be made by the protection analysis team to identify the final set of 3 – 5 stories from across the HCT, which demonstrate significant changes in the protection risk patterns identified by HCT members. At each step of the process, the reasons for the selections should be recorded and compiled, as they may contain useful information about why the observed changes are relevant to the priority protection risks identified in the protection action plan.

Again, it is important to agree a selection schema ahead of time, and this should be done by the protection analysis team and based on the role of different agencies in the particular domains of change that have been identified in Step 1.

## STEP 3: PROVIDE FEEDBACK

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team | On a periodic basis, for example once every three months, linked to HCT processes for reviewing and adapting the protection action plan | Final selection of stories of change |

Once the most significant changes have been identified, the protection analysis team should feedback critical information to the HCT and HC, particularly regarding unexpected changes or significant changes that have been observed. This may involve, for example, sharing the fact that night patrols in one area were linked to GBV incidence. Sharing this information within the HCT can help to improve programming by adjusting resources and activities to improve effectiveness in light of unexpected changes such as this. Sharing this information with other organizations doing similar work in the same context can also greatly add to the community-wide learning effort. And sharing information with the community can provide an additional space for validation of findings and community feedback.

## 4.2 OUTCOME HARVESTING

Outcome Harvesting is an approach for identifying, formulating, verifying, analysing and interpreting outcomes in contexts where the relationship between the activity conducted by, for example, HCT members and the effect it has on protection risk is unclear. It is designed to capture all relevant changes observed at community-level, regardless of whether or not they match the specific intended changes described in a theory of change. As such, it has potential value in complex or dynamic settings such as those in which protection action plans are implemented.

There are five steps to the streamlined outcome harvesting approach in this framework, in addition to Step 1 outlined above:[8]

- **Step 2: Design the harvest**
- **Step 3: Gather data and perceptions**
- **Step 4: Substantiate the outcomes**
- **Step 5: Analyze and interpret**
- **Step 6: Support the use of findings**

### STEP 2: DESIGN THE HARVEST

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team | Iteratively, each time the protection action plan is up for review and adaptation. Step 2 should begin two months before the action plan review, to allow time for data collection and analysis. | Protection action plan, KIIs with HCT members |

The first step in an outcome harvest is to decide the top 1-3 questions you want the harvest to answer. Outcome harvest questions should be broad in scope, addressing results achieved in the key domains of change identified in Step 1, and asking open questions about the way that the activities undertaken through the action plan have influenced change in these domains. This helps to generate learning about the ways in which the protection action plan is contributing to risk reduction, rather than just measuring success or failure. So the questions should the following broad schema:

8 This framework presents a shortened version of the original outcome harvesting tool, in order to make it practical in the time-constrained contexts of HCT operations. For a full presentation of the original method, please see: Wilson-Grau and Britt (2013) *Outcome Harvesting*. Ford Foundation; Wilson-Grau (2015) 'Outcome Harvesting' **https://www.betterevaluation.org/plan/approach/outcome_harvesting**

**how has {activity X in the protection action plan} influenced {result Y in the domain of change}?**

To make a harvest useful for measuring the results of a protection action plan, it will need to focus on collecting information about interim results achieved to date, contextualized against the protection risks identified therein. For example:

- What has been the result of the activities in the protection action plan on the behavior of members of armed group X towards members of community Y? **(Threat)**
- How have HCT members improved the capacity of community groups in community X to monitor instances of inter-communal violence in area Y? **(Capacity)**
- How have different members of the HCT worked together to reduce vulnerabilities of IDPs in the host community to sexual violence and coercion? **(Vulnerability)**

It is important to keep these questions focused at the level of the domains of change, and to resist using specific indicators instead. This allows the Measurement framework to learn about unanticipated changes that may not have been foreseen during the design of the protection action plan, which in turn increases the potential learning value of the final product. Likewise, it is important to restrict the number of question asked, otherwise the depth of evidence provided for each one will inevitably drop as the finite amount of data collection is spread across multiple questions.

## STEP 3: GATHER DATA AND PERCEPTIONS

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team via an external MEAL consultancy | Once, as soon as Step 2 is complete | Protection action plan, HCT member strategy and program documents, KIIs with HCT members, non-HCT members, and other protection actors |

Once the questions have been agreed, an external MEAL expert, or team of experts, should conduct the harvest. It is important for this to be done by an external expert, as it increases the openness of interviewees to share examples of changes observed that sit outside of the intended results of the protection action plan.

Step 3 requires the experts to review available data and create draft outcome statements describing the results observed. The net should be cast wide regarding documentation to be reviewed, to ensure that the expert is able to capture as many different types of relevant change as possible. This could include reviewing program monitoring reports, needs analyses, AAP reports, or any other data capturing behavior change within the community. It can also include data from other protection actors identified in the context-specific theory of change who are active in the same crisis setting. Where documentation is weak, the expert may need to conduct some key informant interviews with HCT members or even community members, but these should be limited at this stage.

The expert should then review all the secondary data collected and present a list of outcome statements derived from the review. Outcome statements should be short, typically just one or two sentences, and should focus sharply on what changed, for whom and when. They should also provide a separate statement about the contribution of the protection action plan activities towards the outcome observed, based on any evidence available through the secondary data review and limited interviews conducted. For example, one outcome statement might look like the following:

| | Outcome description |
|---|---|
| **Outcome statement** | Armed actors in group X conducted less patrols in areas close to the IDP camp during the early evening. Patrols started to reduce two months after the HCT member Y began advocacy activity Z with group X. By the time the outcome harvest was conducted, patrols had largely ceased in this area during the evening. |
| **Contribution statement** | Members of group X had been confronting IDP community members as they collected firewood in the early evening outside the camp. IDP communities had cited this time as the most dangerous time for them to suffer violence at the hands of group X's members. The advocacy activities undertaken by HCT member Y focused on the illegality and consequences of committing violence against civilians in the IDP community. Senior soldiers reported fearing the consequences of allowing their units to commit violence against IDP civilians, and claimed to have instructed their units to change patrol schedules. |

The expert should collect a large number of such statements during Step 3, covering each of the domains of change identified in the protection action plan.

## STEP 4: SUBSTANTIATE THE OUTCOMES

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team via an external MEAL consultancy | Once, as soon as Step 3 is complete | KIIs and/or focus group discussions with community members, leaders and representatives |

In this step the expert and the protection analysis team should review the outcome descriptions and select a sample to verify. To verify the selection, the expert should try to interview stakeholders who are independent of the HCT members and their activities, but who have some knowledge of the activities conducts. IDP community leaders, for example, or civilians who collect firewood in the IDP community, would be well-placed to verify outcome statements in the example above. Likewise, where possible, members of the armed group who took part in awareness-raising activities might be approached if no risk of harm is presented.

## STEP 5: ANALYZE AND INTERPRET

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team via an external MEAL consultancy | Once, as soon as Step 4 is complete | Outcome statements developed in Steps 3 and 4 |

The expert then analyzes and interprets the findings of the outcome statements and contribution analyses, and seeks to group and classify them into thematic areas. A good way to do this is to classify the outcomes according to the risk equation, e.g.

| Threat | Vulnerability | Capacity |
|---|---|---|
| The armed actors slowly stopped patrolling areas close to the IDP camp during firewood collection hours. | IDP groups began collecting firewood in large groups of mixed ages. | The IDP households decreased firewood collection and increased firewood purchase in the local market. |

Once this is done, the expert should interpret the information collected and seek to answer the harvesting questions identified in Step 2.

## STEP 6: SUPPORT THE USE OF FINDINGS

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team via an external MEAL consultancy | Once, as soon as Step 5 is complete | Analytical document produced under Step 5 |

Finally, the expert and protection analysis team should discuss the conclusions with the HCT members and other key protection actors identified in the context-specific theory of change. They should present the major answers to the harvest questions, as well as the outcome statements and contribution analyses, highlighting any areas of unintended consequences or information that the program team may not be aware of. The discussion should aim at identifying lessons and avenues for adapting the protection action plan.

## 4.3 RESULTS JOURNALS

A results journal is a tool for collecting data about behavior change over time. What makes it a journal is the use of a community-based record of changes over time. What makes it a results journal is the focus on behavior changes within the community itself; rather than recording progress in delivering a set of activities.

Following the identification of domains of change under Step 1 of the Measurement framework above, the protection analysis team should begin Step 2, below:

### STEP 2: DEFINE PROGRESS MARKERS FOR EACH DOMAIN OF CHANGE

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team | Once, as soon as Step 1 is complete | Protection action plan, KIIs with HCT members, non-HCT members, and other protection actors |

For each domain of change identified in Step 1, the protection analysis team should, in consultation with HCT members and other protection actors, define 3-6 progress markers for each domain.

Progress markers are indicators of community-based change in behavior, attitudes, beliefs, and norms, which mark the steps along the path to the broad-based change identified in the domain of change. They are the changes that underpin reductions in protection risk, for example:

- Commitments to abide by IHL made by conflict actors
- Increased awareness of protection risks among vulnerable populations and groups
- Individual actions by individual leaders to reduce IHL violations by a particular armed group
- Widespread changes in behavior or attitude among threat actors and vulnerable communities

Depending on the types of activities undertaken, these markers might be disaggregated according to the degree to which they are simply expected to occur given the activity, or they are demonstrative of the wider more fundamental risk reduction being sought. For an activity engaging armed leaders in IHL awareness training, for example, the progress markers above could be categorised as follows:

- **Expect to see:** Commitments to abide by IHL made by conflict actors
- **Like to see:** Individual actions by individual leaders to reduce IHL violations by a particular armed group
- **Love to see:** Widespread changes in behavior or attitude among armed actors

The protection analysis team and HCT members should aim to agree on 1-2 progress markers at each level above (expect, like, love to see) for each domain of change identified in Step 1.

## STEP 3: DESIGN A RESULTS JOURNAL FORMAT FOR DATA COLLECTION

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team | Once, as soon as Step 2 is complete | N/A |

Once Step 2 is complete, the protection analysis team should design a template for collecting evidence about the progress markers identified. A simple tool for doing this could look like the following:

| Progress marker | Category | Risk factor | Observed (Y/N) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Commitments to abide by IHL made by conflict actors | Expect to see | Threat | |
| Increased awareness of protection risks among vulnerable populations and groups | Expect to see | Capacity | |
| Individual actions by individual leaders to reduce IHL violations by a particular armed group | Like to see | Threat | |
| Widespread changes in behavior or attitude among threat actors and vulnerable communities | Love to see | Theat/Capacity | |

This template is designed to be simple to use and quick to analyze. Other templates are available in the **InterAction GBV Prevention Results-Based Evaluation Framework**.

## STEP 4: COLLECT RESULTS JOURNAL DATA

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team, HCT member agencies | On an ongoing basis, utilizing pre-existing community engagement and feedback mechanisms, throughout the implementation of the protection action plan | Community members through interviews and, where appropriate, focus group discussions |

The results journal template should be shared with protection analysis team members and HCT members agencies and used as a framework for community interviews and focus groups whenever these are conducted during the implementation of the protection action plan.

Interviewers and focus group facilitators should ask community members whether or not they have observed each of the progress markers in their template over a fixed time period, e.g. the last month. They should also record basic meta-data including: location of interview, date of interview and basic demographic data regarding the interviewee.

It is important to utilize all pre-existing community-engagement opportunities to collect data using this journal, whether that includes AAP feedback activities, Emergency Director missions, ERC quick visits, HQ missions by HCT member agencies, or annual report protocols. The goal is to collect as many examples of results journals completed during the protection action plan, on a continuous basis, alongside the continuous protection risk analysis conducted under Benchmark #1, and supporting continuous adaptation of the protection action plan.

## STEP 5: ANALYZE THE RESULTS AND FEED BACK TO HCT TEAMS

| Who should do it | When & how often | Data sources |
|---|---|---|
| Protection analysis team | On a periodic basis, for example once every three months, linked to HCT processes for reviewing and adapting the protection action plan | Collated data from the results journals completed up to that point |

As the results journals are completed, the protection analysis team should compile the data and create an analytical report picking out emerging trends, such as areas, communities or demographics where protection risk is being reduced, or where it is not, and make recommendations to adapt the protection action plan accordingly.

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