



Background on Access Negotiations

Mercy Corps often needs to conduct “access negotiations” with non-state armed groups (NSAGs)¹ to secure and sustain access to target populations or locations, provide assistance to vulnerable households, and ensure the safety of Mercy Corps staff and integrity of our operations. We define access negotiations as back-and-forth communication to gain safe access to vulnerable populations while adhering to humanitarian principles, donor requirements, and laws.² Unlike traditional bargaining, such negotiations do not imply a “give and take” or even an agreement, but rather a discussion of underlying motivations and ways to satisfy them.

According to our 2016 Humanitarian Access Negotiation Survey results, 60% of country teams have had to negotiate with state and non-state armed groups to gain humanitarian access, and 33% of respondents reported that they have been unable to implement programs as a result of not achieving their negotiation goals. Recognizing the significance of these negotiations, Mercy Corps has developed the following guidance, which rests on the following five pillars:

- 1) Adhere to humanitarian principles, donor requirements, and laws;
- 2) Analyze the reduced access context;
- 3) Analyze the context of engagement with armed groups;
- 4) Use a principled approach to negotiate for access; and
- 5) Influence peer agencies to adopt our approach.

This document provides guidance to country teams on engaging with armed groups to achieve our access goals. For more tactical advice on how to deal with difficult tactics in access negotiations with both state and non-state actors, consult [Mercy Corps’ Negotiating for Humanitarian Access Playbook](#).

Pillar 1: Adhere to Humanitarian Principles, Donor Requirements, and Laws

The overarching principle for engagement with armed groups is that we **never barter humanitarian principles, donor requirements, or laws in exchange for access.**

Adhere to Humanitarian Principles

Humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and operational independence are fundamental principles that guide agencies in carrying out humanitarian activities. We need to ensure that we, **as well as those who negotiate on our behalf**, uphold these principles when engaging armed groups. The principles below

¹ NSAGs operate outside the formal military structures of states (and therefore include paramilitaries and vigilante groups) and may use arms to achieve political, ideological, or economic objectives.

² References to laws in this document pertain primarily to donor government laws, the adherence to which is a global Mercy Corps expectation. Country teams are expected to use their best judgment on dealing with the range of local rules and laws, including those established by non-government entities, and to call the Legal Department and/or email the Mercy Corps hotline (hotline@mercycorps.org) with questions.



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are also endorsed by the [ICRC Code of Conduct](#).

- **Humanity:** Human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found, with particular attention to the most vulnerable populations, such as children, women, and the elderly. The dignity and rights of survivors must be respected and protected.
- **Neutrality**³: Humanitarian assistance will be provided without participating in hostilities or taking sides in controversies of a political, religious, or ideological nature.
- **Impartiality:** When humanitarian assistance is provided, it will be without discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin, political opinion, gender, nationality, race, or religion. Provision of assistance is guided solely by needs, and priority is given to the most vulnerable cases.
- **Operational Independence:** Humanitarian activities must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian activities are being implemented.

These longstanding principles are the cornerstone of humanitarian operations, and are derived in varying degrees from international humanitarian law (IHL), human rights law, and a UN General Assembly Resolution (Resolution 46/182 (19 December 1991)). These principles are part of codes of conduct (see “The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief” in Annex 2, page 368, of the [SPHERE Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards](#)) and organizational mission statements guiding humanitarian organizations. (To learn more about humanitarian principles, consider registering for [“The Sphere Handbook in Action Online Course” at DisasterReady.org.](#)) While NSAGs in internal armed conflicts are required by common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions to respect humanitarian obligations, many clearly don’t feel compelled to adhere to such protocols. If framing the discussion around humanitarian standards yields little progress, consider noting that the principles are based on ethics and morality, and have roots in all monotheistic religions (for example, Islamic law differentiates between combatants and non-combatants, and explicitly requires all Muslims to protect civilians in warzones), recognizing that such a move may trigger a strong negative reaction in some contexts.

All countries that have signed on to the Geneva Conventions are required to structure their laws to protect principled humanitarian action. While the Geneva Convention may be little known or understood in many countries where we work, strict adherence by Mercy Corps to these principles is often the best defense against hostile action by donor governments, host countries, and foreign states. Straying from these principles would jeopardize this protection and offend one or more stakeholder governments.

Case Study

Your primary route into an area of makeshift IDP camps has multiple zones of control by armed factions. Over time, one-off demands for a tax on emergency goods have become common. Your truck drivers alert you that 20% of our materials are now being demanded as a “standard tax” for passing through the area.

³ Different views exist within Mercy Corps about whether it is always possible and/or prudent to maintain neutrality.



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Should we agree to transfer 20% of your materials to the armed group? No! Here are a few reasons Mercy Corps should never agree to such a demand:

*We would set a dangerous precedent by demonstrating that the armed group can obtain supplies from us by intercepting our vehicles and making demands, increasing the likelihood they would use these tactics in the future. As word spreads that these tactics work, 20% for this one checkpoint would eventually become 50% for all checkpoints. This would quickly jeopardize all aid operations, not just ours, in the area.

*If the armed group is a foreign terrorist organization ([as designated by the U.S. State Department](#)), we would be violating terms of our grant agreements and criminal prohibitions and material support statutes. In fact, some agreements with USAID explicitly prohibit “engag[ing] in transactions with, or provid[ing] resources or support to, individuals and organizations associated with terrorism, including those individuals or entities that appear on the [Specifically Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List maintained by the U.S. Treasury](#) or the [United Nations Security designation list](#).” If we are not honest about what happened to the commodities, we might also be engaging in fraudulent activity.

*We would make it easier for states, government officials, and journalists to make unproven and uninvestigated accusations that could harm Mercy Corps’ reputation, potentially reducing donor confidence and undermining community acceptance.

*We would potentially reinforce lines of conflict and/or exacerbate tensions and grievances if resources are perceived to benefit certain groups over others.

We can avoid making damaging concessions to armed groups by adhering to the five pillars of engagement outlined in this document.

Specifically, we should not accept armed actors’ requests to:

- **Obtain taxes, duties, or any other form of payment** or benefit related to aid deliveries or humanitarian services to beneficiaries. If authorities legally require payment of taxes and duties, the formal procedures and requirements for doing so should be publicly available. (If they’re not available, ask why not). Even if such fees are imposed by law, if the armed group is a designated terrorist organization or a sanctioned entity, we cannot make such payments unless we are specifically authorized to do so by a U.S. Office of Foreign Asset Controls license.
- **Obtain personal information about beneficiaries.** We must protect the privacy and dignity of recipients of humanitarian assistance.
- **Influence the selection or management of our staff, local partners, vendors or other key stakeholders.** We must ensure our independence is respected by all parties. We cannot allow any armed group to influence who we hire (e.g., a family member) or with whom we transact. We cannot, for example, hire a company owned by a close associate of an armed group if we are aware of the association and there is any indication that the armed group would view the hiring/firing of the company as a factor in its decision-making regarding access. Allowing an armed group to have that influence could violate criminal material support laws, anti-bribery laws such as the [UK Bribery Act](#), donor requirements, and anti-fraud laws. Most importantly, allowing an armed group to have this influence would violate our principle of impartiality. Practically speaking, once this influence is gained, it can quickly become impossible to undo.



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Such influence would pose ever-increasing security risks to our staff and result in our full withdrawal from an area. In the past, the loss of donors' trust has resulted in their withdrawal of funding from all organizations for a particular area.

- **Provide armed or other escorts** for humanitarian vehicles or personnel that would compromise our impartiality. The presence of such escorts could create a misperception that Mercy Corps is a part to the conflict and/or aligned with a key actor. Similarly, we should not transport their team members, colleagues, friends, and/or relatives —regardless of whether they are armed and/or uniformed — via Mercy Corps vehicles or convoys. Doing so could endanger our safety and/or compromise our impartiality.
- **Influence the content or findings** of needs assessments or other questionnaires. We must maintain independence and assess needs impartially so they are credible and acceptable to the international community and beneficiaries.
- **Receive humanitarian assistance.** Under IHL, only wounded combatants without weapons are considered *hors de combat* ("outside the fight") and may be treated by medical agencies.
- **Take control of humanitarian stores**, commodities or warehouses.

If we instead uphold humanitarian principles, we enhance a reputation that will help us gain access in the future.

Adhere to Donor Requirements and Laws

There are no donor government legal restrictions on communicating with armed groups. Under international humanitarian law (IHL), discussions about access do not confer recognition or legitimacy on any party. However, there are many legal restrictions on give-and-take bargaining between humanitarian agencies and armed actors. **Providing anything of value to an armed group, or allowing an armed group to influence who we hire, contract with, or assist** could violate terms of our grant agreements, criminal prohibitions, and material support statutes. If we are not honest about what happened to the commodities, we might also be engaging in fraudulent activity. You should pay particular attention to these restrictions when engaging an armed group that violates human rights. Under the U.S. "Leahy Law," there is a prohibition on material support to foreign military units or individuals suspected of committing "gross human rights violations" such as extrajudicial killing, rape, torture, and forced disappearances. We cannot provide assistance to a foreign military unit unless the State Department has vetted it to ensure it has a clean human rights record. You should also consider these restrictions when engaging an armed group that is a designated terrorist group or a sanctioned entity, or is affiliated with, uses its resources to support, or is owned or controlled by such a group. In the United States, acts that are "material support" of terrorism include the provision of lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, communications equipment, facilities, personnel, and transportation.

To protect against this outcome, in addition to implementing all of our standard controls in the [Field Finance Manual](#), [Field Procurement Manual](#), etc. we need to take the following steps (as outlined in the [Reduced Access Programming Framework](#)) when operating in areas where NSAGs are present:

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- Understand and document the various means by which resources could fall into the hands of such a group. For example, could they control the bakery where you are sending flour? Do they control the local council that assists with identifying beneficiaries? Will they require approval for whom and how you conduct distributions? Do they require tolls at checkpoints?
- Document the comprehensive methods used to understand who we are working with (sub-grantees, partners, vendors, communities, etc.). Think holistically about all of the various information streams to understand how we know who an entity or organization is, who they are owned or controlled by, and whether the entity or its owners / key personnel in control are tied to an armed group.
- Understand and document all other risk mitigation measures (such as program monitoring, community acceptance efforts, formal and informal reference checks, security information, and avoidance of checkpoints where tolls are required) to prevent diversion to or transactions with an NSAG.
- Work with the Legal Department and Finance and Compliance Support Unit to develop a document that lays out the risks and mitigation measures -- this will be a key document that donors will request. Ensure that you follow an established plan, and that you regularly review and update the plan as the situation changes.

Call the Legal Department or email the Mercy Corps hotline (hotline@mercy Corps.org) immediately if you suspect that Mercy Corps resources or assistance have been provided to or taken by an NSAG or a foreign military unit that has committed significant human rights violations.

Pillar 2: Analyze the Reduced Access Context

Contexts where negotiations with armed groups are necessary are often characterized by heightened risk, and in many cases, reduced access to locations and program participants. Understanding the constrained context is our starting point for developing an engagement strategy. [Mercy Corps' Reduced Access Programming Framework](#), which builds on the normal steps of the security and program planning processes, requires a thorough analysis of the context, including an assessment of needs, threats, and vulnerabilities. We want to answer several key questions:

- What are the risks we face in the specific geographic area?
- What are the trends (political, conflict, ethnic, socio-economic, and ecological)?





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- What actors constitute a direct threat? Do we know all actors (armed and not) in this environment and understand their motivators, benefactors, and profiles?
- How can we mitigate this threat, taking into account acceptance, protection, and possible support from other actors? What is our security strategy?

In highly insecure areas, Mercy Corps will normally convene frequent meetings of senior management and security management teams that are well-positioned to analyze the context and explore the impact of our actions on the political and military landscape. A tool to support such analysis is our [Context, Conflict, and Do No Harm Analysis Tool](#).

Pillar 3: Analyze the Context of Engagement with Armed Groups

Should Mercy Corps engage with armed groups? **It depends. We should systematically analyze whether it makes sense by analyzing the context with external stakeholders and then analyzing dynamics that involve our armed group counterparts:**

1. Analyze Context with External Stakeholders, Including Key Risks

Before deciding to engage an armed group, consider whether these discussions could damage key relationships with external stakeholders such as donors, the U.S. Congress, local authorities, and program participants. Would it be problematic if external stakeholders found out about our communication with the armed group? Would there be reputational damage to Mercy Corps, or would this negatively impact our programs? If Mercy Corps is operating in an area controlled by one armed group and wants to gain access to an area controlled by an opposing armed group, consider how negotiations with the opposing armed group might affect Mercy Corps' operations in the original area. Consult the Stakeholder Mapping section of the [Negotiating for Humanitarian Access Playbook](#) for guidance on analyzing key actors and their relationships to determine who we should communicate with and in what sequence. You should also consult the [Mercy Corps Field Security Manual](#) for guidance.

2. Analyze Dynamics that Involve our Armed Group Counterparts

Mercy Corps' Seven Elements of Negotiation framework (see table below) provides a useful guide to determining whether engaging armed groups makes sense.

Element of Negotiation	Considerations to Take into Account
Relationship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do we have enough of a relationship that we can reasonably expect to influence them? • If not, do we believe that such a relationship can be built?
Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do we have a pathway to open, regular, and honest communication? • Would it be problematic if other armed actors found out about our communication with the armed group? • Do we have reliable contacts of the top leader and know how to reach him / her directly if needed?



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Interests	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What do they want and could we satisfy those needs without running afoul of humanitarian principles? • What are the potential upsides for us (e.g. access to vulnerable populations)? • What are the potential downsides (e.g. putting our staff and/or reputation at risk)?
Options	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How likely is the group to be open to exploring creative options that would result in a better outcome for us than the status quo?
Legitimacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Do we have an opportunity to persuade them using standards such as core humanitarian principles and international law?
Alternatives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the negative consequences if we don't negotiate with them (i.e. what is our Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, or BATNA, and theirs?) • What are the negative consequences for us (e.g., endangering our staff) if they go to their BATNA after we start negotiating?
Commitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What does the chain of command look like? • Do they have the authority to do what we want them to do, and are they present in the operational area? • Are they likely to do what they say they're going to do?

Based on these analyses, we can develop security strategies and make program adjustments to reduce risk while ensuring access. Teams should identify who will manage these relationships and ensure that the designated team is well-informed regarding their legal, ethical, and humanitarian principle obligations. The team responsible for the relationship, meetings, and communication with the armed group should, to the extent possible, always involve two Mercy Corps team members.

Pillar 4: Use a Principled Approach to Negotiate for Access

After preparing thoroughly by analyzing the context of engagement with armed groups, adopt a principled approach to access negotiations, as laid out in [Mercy Corps' Negotiating for Humanitarian Access Playbook](#). Consider saying and doing the following things when negotiating for access:

1. Explore the **interests** and concerns behind any of their requests. What are they trying to achieve? Why is it important to them that they, for example, accompany our personnel or prevent us from moving through the checkpoint? Consider whether it might be possible for us to satisfy those interests without compromising humanitarian principles, endangering staff, and violating material support statutes.



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2. To increase the likelihood that they articulate their interests with us, share our **interests** in adhering to humanitarian principles, assisting those who need it most, and ensuring the safety of our staff.
3. Discuss a range of possible **options** to meet their Interests and satisfy ours. While these options may sometimes include 'agreements' or 'conclusions' about our engagement process, they also include messages we communicate to meet their concerns while enabling us to achieve our goals. For example:
 - They could grant unhindered access to areas under the control of parties to the conflict
 - We could provide publically available information about Mercy Corps
 - We could share information on planned humanitarian activities in areas under the control / influence of a party to the conflict
 - We could create a joint protocol (carefully translated into relevant languages to ensure no uncertainty regarding meanings) by which Mercy Corps and the armed group agree to terms, such as:
 - They ensure access and free passage (*laissez passer*) to pass checkpoints. (Make sure you know when and where the *laissez passer* will work and where it is a problem.)
 - We forego armed escort or other accompaniment that would place at risk our impartial and neutral status
 - They agree not to request beneficiary lists or otherwise interfere with beneficiaries' participation in our activities
 - Both Mercy Corps and the armed group create a mechanism to re-engage to solve problems
 - We could agree to return later, perhaps when another armed group decision-maker we've communicated with in the past will be present.
 - We could involve also community representatives as observers to negotiations.
4. Share objective **standards of legitimacy** about Mercy Corps policy that might persuade them to agree to the options above:
 - Inform them that Mercy Corps applies a standard approach globally, and that we **never barter humanitarian principles, donor requirements, or laws in exchange for access.**
 - If we've been granted access to this area in the past, remind them of that and the rationale for giving access, and ask what has changed.
 - If we are able to access a nearby area that seems similar, inform them of that and ask why this area is different.
 - Inform them about our standards for delivering aid, specifically how we select beneficiaries in consultation with local communities.
 - Share our mission to alleviate suffering, poverty, and oppression by helping people secure just, secure, and productive communities.
 - Share our track record of success in this country.

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5. If we believe the armed groups maintain a political agenda and/or care about their public image, moral authority, and sources of legitimacy, then share objective **standards of legitimacy** related to IHL.

- Inform them that where lack of relief would result in starvation, refusing relief in territories they control would violate IHL.⁴
- Inform them that the following customary law applies in all situations of armed conflict: “The parties to the conflict must allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need, which is impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, subject to their right of control.”⁵ Ask if there’s any reason that standard wouldn’t apply in this situation.
- If the armed group has signed a [Deed of Commitment](#) stating that it adheres to universal humanitarian norms (for example, unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief), consider reminding them of that. (As of April 2016, 18 non-state armed groups had signed Deeds of Commitment). However, it is important to keep discussions about **signing** Deeds of Commitment **separate from** discussions about negotiating access. Especially in asymmetrical environments where Mercy Corps is engaging with more than one group or operating across frontlines and in territory controlled by opposing groups, it is important to seek the *minimum necessary outcome* from engagement.

6. Consider our **Alternatives** to an agreement with the relevant armed group

- Consider whether we can come back later, even if we don’t discuss this explicitly.
- Consider whether there is someone else on our team who might be better-positioned to persuade the armed group.
- Consider whether there is an external actor (e.g. community leader, respected and neutral person in the community, other INGO representative) who knows and values our work and might be able to advocate on our behalf. For example, the South Sudan country team, an active member of the UN OCHA Access Working Group, leveraged its relationship with UN OCHA mediators to convince them to persuade rebel groups to stop imposing illegal taxes (see [Reduced Access Programming](#), pp. 29-30)
- Consider whether there is someone else within the armed group who we can talk to at another time who might be more sympathetic to the plight of beneficiaries and to our mission.
- If gaining access here seems overwhelmingly unlikely, consider whether we can redouble our relief efforts in another critical geography where access is less constrained.

⁴ Article 54§1 of Additional Protocol I (AP I) to the Geneva Conventions (GC) of 12 August 1949: “Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.” See also rule 53, ICRC Customary IHL Database, http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule53 (via “Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict: Handbook on the International Normative Framework”, Version 2, December 2014)

⁵ See Rule 55 of the ICRC International Customary Law Study. http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/customary-ihl/engdocs/v1_rul_rule55. For information on what is a customary rule, see Chapter 2. (via “Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict: Handbook on the International Normative Framework”, Version 2, December 2014)



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In addition, consider the following general guidance from field teams for your access negotiations:

DO the following	DON'T do the following
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Do cultivate relationships and invest time with stakeholders by demonstrating respect to those in power (formally or informally), sharing useful information, showing familiar faces (same ethnicity) and consistent faces (sending same people instead of rotating), and leveraging local contacts and networks ● Do coordinate with NGOs and other stakeholders to align on a negotiation strategy ● Do maintain close coordination, in particular, with ICRC and UN OCHA ● Do cooperate and share non-sensitive information via third parties like INSO or local authorities so that key actors understand our mandate and mission ● Do provide frequent updates about programmatic activities at the macro level (e.g. beneficiary lists) to local government officials. This promotes trust and transparency, which increases the chances that they will share information with us. ● Do use the Stakeholder Mapping Tool to 1) identify members of the Mercy Corps negotiation team and their roles, 2) understand the relationships among the relevant actors, and 2) develop an optimal strategy for determining where to invest resources in networking, negotiations, or other activities. ● Do get each group to agree to exactly the same terms (as a Standard of Legitimacy when negotiating with Group A, we can reference that Group B has agreed to these terms) ● Do ensure that any agreement with armed groups is well-known within the group, and have Mercy Corps staff carry a copy of the agreement with them and the phone number of the person in authority who made the agreement ● Do work with a commander who has authority and is present in the operational area 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Don't barter humanitarian principles, donor requirements, or laws in exchange for access ● Don't try to go around / above the military to state authorities ● Don't try to skirt around official channels by "sweet-talking" soldiers at checkpoints on an ad hoc basis ● Don't drive around in flashy 4x4s (unless there is some good reason to do so) or display use of hi-tech electronic equipment ● Don't avoid engaging with the military, when it may be necessary to do so (directly or indirectly) to achieve our objectives ● Don't attract attention by maintaining a large presence of expats, especially Caucasians and/or any nationalities that are generally unpopular or may stand out ● Don't rely on one group or organization (UN or others) to forge a path of access for all humanitarians, as the UN may rely on armed escorts, even for joint assessments ● Don't show up late to meetings with government agencies, even if those meetings are just preliminary discussions ● Don't disregard traditional and customary norms ● Don't make promises you can't keep ● Don't assume that appealing to religious beliefs or political views will generate a positive reaction



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Pillar 5: Influence Peer Agencies to Adopt Our Approach

Many contexts where we provide assistance share the following characteristics:

- The International Committee of the Red Cross is not present in areas controlled by opposition groups where we're providing assistance
- Engaging armed groups is necessary to achieve our humanitarian objectives
- Many actors are simultaneously providing assistance and interacting with armed groups

Where possible, Mercy Corps should take the lead through working groups with peer agencies and discuss how we can ensure a coordinated approach to engaging armed groups. Otherwise, we fail to mitigate the risk that peer agencies will barter humanitarian principles, donor requirements, or laws in exchange for access, setting a dangerous precedent and potentially violating the law.

One of the best ways to ensure our peer agencies adopt our approach to strict adherence to humanitarian principles, donor requirements, and laws is to develop joint operating principles or protocols to be signed by all humanitarian actors operating in an area and interacting with armed groups. Consider seeking agreement first from organizations most inclined to support such an effort so that entities likely to be resistant may be persuaded by the number of groups that have signed on to the protocols. [Here is an example of the agreement](#) reached by Mercy Corps with Syrian NGOs and INGOs to coordinate our approach in Syria. This became necessary in Syria when peer agencies allowed armed groups to serve as escorts and allowed ISIS to access their agency operations in exchange for humanitarian access.

Resources

Mercy Corps Contacts

- ❖ For questions about this document or access negotiation generally, contact Joe Bubman.
- ❖ For targeted support in engaging with armed groups, contact Dee Goluba, Director of Field Security; Damien Damien Vallette d'Ossia, Regional Security Advisor, East & Southern Africa; or Steve Gordon, Regional Safety and Security Manager. Dee's team can provide remote or in-person support.
- ❖ For legal questions, contact Jeremiah Centrella, General Counsel & Assistant Corporate Secretary
- ❖ For questions about humanitarian principles or Mercy Corps' approach to providing humanitarian assistance, contact Michael Bowers or Erynn Carter.

Internal Resources

- ❖ [Reduced Access Programming: Delivering Impact in Constrained Environments](#), July 2015
- ❖ [Negotiating for Humanitarian Access Playbook](#), October 2016

External Resources

- ❖ [Counter-terrorism Laws and Regulations: What Aid Agencies Need to Know](#) Humanitarian Practice Network, November 2014
- ❖ [Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict: Practitioner's Manual \(Dec 2014\)](#). Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, UNOCHA, and CDI
- ❖ [Humanitarian Access in Situations of Armed Conflict: Handbook on the International Normative Framework \(Dec 2014\)](#) Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, UNOCHA, and CDI
- ❖ [Humanitarian Action under Scrutiny: Criminalizing Humanitarian Engagement](#): Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Working Paper, Harvard University February 2011
- ❖ [Humanitarian Engagement with Non-State Armed Actors: the Parameters of Negotiated Access](#). HPN Network Paper, no. 51. Glaser, M. (2005)
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- ❖ [Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups: A Manual for Practitioners](#). United Nations
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- ❖ [Rules of Engagement: Protecting Civilians through Dialogue with Armed Non-State Actors](#). Geneva: Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law. Bellal, A. and S. Casey-Maslen (2011)