

From Analysis to Action




Protection Analysis

**A Review through the lens
of Results-Based Protection**


Protection Analysis

- A review of 25 protection analysis tools
- Tools represent the most often used guidance for protection analysis
- Assessed against several categories – phase of emergency, type of protection issue, methodology, and components of risk: threat, vulnerability, capacity

Analysis Tools by Protection Issue




Assessment of pre-crisis environment



Analysis at multiple levels

Many tools emphasized the need to review threat, vulnerability, and capacity at multiple levels, using various approaches, for example:

- Vulnerability & capacity framework
- Household & livelihoods approach
- National level analysis of child protection situation





Components of Risk

Review Questions:

- Threat
 - Does the tool or training package provide guidance on how to address the threat faced by affected populations?
- Vulnerability
 - Does the tool provide guidance on how to disaggregate data? If so, how far does it go beyond sex and age
- Capacity
 - Is there recognition that communities have their own protection or coping mechanisms? What are those protection mechanisms?
 - Does the tool provide guidance for identifying and working with those mechanisms?

Threat


Threat analysis, situation/context analysis



- No mention of threat analysis or situation analysis
- Relates threat to vulnerability/capacity
- Community identifies threats
- Broader context analysis, not specific to detailed threats
- Specific risks and their consequences, causes identified


Vulnerability

Means of disaggregation captured in analysis tools



Capacity

Community-Based Protection Mechanisms Recognized in Analysis Tools



- No mention of community capacity
- Include guidance on assessing / identifying community capacity
- Provide actual example questions
- Interpretation / analysis

Examples of questions on community-based protection mechanisms in analyzed tools

"What are the coping mechanisms (positive and negative) used by the affected populations?"

"What capacities do people have to mitigate these threats and their impact?"

"Which positive coping mechanisms are likely to offset the negative impacts of the disaster?"

"Examine the capacity of households to prevent and/or overcome shocks/hazards, degree of people's livelihood resistance and resilience"

" Are the coping mechanisms enough to cope with the situation?"

"Are the community coping mechanisms sustainable?"

"Do not underestimate the capacity of communities to influence their own environment - their coping mechanisms can often be a good starting point, and certainly should not be undermined by any intervention."

Capacity

Examples of community-based protection mechanisms given by analysis tools

- Examples given are both positive and negative
- Some tools conflate community coping mechanisms with agency activities (e.g. emphasizing advocacy or training)




Analysis of actors responding to risk (humanitarian, govt., civil society, peacekeepers, etc)

- Most comprehensive assessment of capacity of response comes from general humanitarian assessment tools – **MIRA & HNO** – which include assessment of local/national institutions to respond to crisis as well as international response capabilities and gaps
- Several tools recommend a stakeholder analysis, but do not go beyond recognizing roles and responsibilities of other actors
- The **Child Protection Rapid Assessment Toolkit** appears to go the farthest in assessing the capacity of the response:
 - *It recommends the formation of a task force where actors are able to share their own organization's capacity and resources and discuss the capacity and resources of the local community*

Analysis of Capacity of Responders

Most tools focus on funding resources and staff capacity

Areas of response capacity and frequency of mention in analysis tools







Coordination Handbooks – guidance on analysis

*What about coordination handbooks of the
Global Protection Cluster & Areas of
Responsibility (AoRs)?*

- No handbook provides detailed guidance on HOW to coordinate analysis
 - Most handbooks reinforce the coordinator's role in conducting assessments and analyzing gaps in response

Coordinator Handbooks



General conclusions

- Most analysis tools lack specificity; could benefit from more illustrative examples
- Threat and vulnerability are given more attention whereby capacity remains weak and/or misguided
- Limited to no guidance on how to coordinate analysis; emphasis is on assessments and data collection
- In general, the most comprehensive tools that support a results-based approach to protection are:
 - **“A Guide to Carrying out a Humanitarian Protection Analysis... for managers, advisers, advocates, and field staff”** from Oxfam
 - **“Gender-based Violence Tools Manual: For Assessment & Program Design, Monitoring & Evaluation – in conflict-affected settings”** from RHRC Consortium
 - **“Putting Safety and Dignity First: A guide to protective action in programming”** from Church World Service



Questions



Protection Analysis

Whether and how humanitarians
assess and address threats

Whole of System Review of Protection in Humanitarian Action

“A striking finding of this Review is the **widespread perspective among humanitarians that they do not have a role to play in countering abusive or violent behaviour** even when political and military strategies and tactics pose the biggest threat to life. Many are of the view that since it is a UNSC responsibility to bring wars, and by extension their consequences, to an end, humanitarians do not have a role in challenging the impact of armed conflict on civilians.”

(Whole of System Review, p. 27)

What seems to be happening...

We do address *some* types of threats

- Recruitment of child soldiers
- Trafficking
- Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA)
- Landmines and other explosive devices

For Example:

Recruitment of children into armed forces

- Threat identified – children being recruited into armed forces
- Vulnerabilities – time/location of exposure, lack of education, opportunities, resources
- Capacities – local institutions/religious organizations, community leadership, children’s coping mechanisms
- Different organizations respond to threat/vulnerability at different levels according to agency capacity and mandate



But not all....

- Some of the most difficult protection issues are avoided
- Attention to threat, vulnerability and capacity is not proportionate or balanced, with an emphasis on addressing vulnerability and capacity while leaving 'the threat component' to someone else.

Difficult protection issues

- Indiscriminate weapons harming civilians
- Deliberate deprivation of aid, food, medical supplies
- Attacks on hospitals
- Pervasive sexual violence in conflict by parties to conflict
- Forced recruitment of men into armed groups

Initial findings

Why don't humanitarians analyse and address specific threats

- Overall: Humanitarian actors often do not view themselves as the appropriate actors to directly address **violent threats**
- Belief that addressing threats means confronting perpetrators or addressing the threat in a direct manner
- Concerns for perceptions of their neutrality, risks to beneficiaries, and resources, funding, or expertise
- Addressing certain threats appears to be “supply-driven,” dependent on the programs already present in a given context
- NGOs tend to analyze threats affecting safe access to services

Initial findings (continued)

- Threats are often examined at the **beginning of the program cycle** and are often understood as a manifestation of a population's vulnerabilities
- Most organizations use a **power or actor analysis** to understand the motivations, interests, resources, and hierarchies of actors perpetrating threats – but most do not go beyond a focus on actors to look at patterns or a systems-level analysis of threats
- There is general recognition that other actors may have a role to respond to a particular threat, but there is little guidance on how to share information with those actors or mobilize those actors' capacities or roles

Discussion

- How can building a causal logic to reduce risk help to move from analysis into action?
- How can we move beyond a single pathway or a “supply-driven” approach to addressing risks to affected populations?
- How can we leverage our collective efforts & capacities to find pathways to address the most severe and challenging protection issues?